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MONTANA, ET AL. 
v. 
Cert to CA9 (Sneed, Anderson, 
D. Williams [DJrr-
UNITED STATES, ET AL!ederal/Civil Timely per extn. 
1. SBMMARY: The questions are: (A) Who owns the stretch 
of the Big Horn River that flows within the boundaries of the Crow 
~ -: 
Indian Reservation? (B) What law defines the boundaries of 
··.·-
privately owned lands riparian to that part of the river? (C) May 
. . 
the Crow Tribe prohibit non-member hunting and fishing within the 
Reservation? 
2. FACTS: The Crow Tribe occupies a Reservation in 




large area (some 38 million acres) that was defined as Crow 
"territory" in the First Treaty of Fort Laramie in 1851. In 1868, 
the Crow Tribe ceded about 30 milion acres of this territory to the 
United States in a treaty which provided that the rest of the 1851 
territory was "set apart for [the Crow Tribe's) absolute and 
undisturbed use and occupation" as their "permanent home." Second 
Treaty of Fort Laramie, Art. 2, 4. The United States "solemnly 
agree[d) that no persons [other than authorized government agents] 
shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in the 
territory described • • " Art. 2. The 1868 Reservation was 
bounded in part by the "mid-channel of the Yellowstone [River]." 
The Big Horn ran within the boundaries of the Reservation from the 
Montana-Wyoming border to its mouth at the Yellowstone. Both rivers 
are navigable streams. 
Although large chunks of land have been ceded to the 
United States since 1868, a major stretch of the Big Horn still 
runs through the center of the Reservation. Under the Allotment 
Acts of 1887 and 1920, the United States has issued patents 
granting title ' to certain Reservation land to individual Indians. 
Some of these lands were conveyed to non-Indians, and about 30% of 
the Reservation is now owned by non-Indians in fee. 43% of 
Reservation residents are non-Indians. 
In 1973, the Crow Tribal Council adopted a resolution, 
No. 74-05, prohibiting all hunting and fishing on the Reservation 
except by members of the Tribe. Montana continued to issue hunting 
and fishing licenses purportedly valid on Crow lands, and to 
declare open seasons in areas closed to such activities by the 
( Tribe. In 1974, the United States prosecuted a non-Indian for 
violating 18 u.s.c. § 1165* by fishing in the Big Horn while 
3. 
standing on state-owned riparian land within the Reservation. The 
DC dismissed the complaint on the ground that Montana owned the Big 
Horn. The CA9 reversed, gnited~tates - ~;-Finch, 548 F.2d 822, but 
this Court vacated on double jeopardy grounds, remanding the case 
with directions that the appeal be dismissed, 433 u.s. 677. 
3. P~OCEEDINGS - BELOW: The present action was initiated by 
the United · States in 1975 to parallel the Finch litigation. The 
Crow Tribe intervened. The complaints sought to quite title to the 
Big Horn in the United States; to enjoin the State from regulating 
non-Indian hunting and fishing within the Reservation; and a 
declaration that the authority to regulate hunting and fishing is 
vested solely in the Tribe and the United States. The DC (Battin, 
D.Mont.) agreed substantially with Montana, holding (1) that the 
State owned the Big Horn to the high-water mark; (2) that the State 
has exclusive authcirity to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing 
on the river and on non-Indian fee lands; (3) that the United 
States has concurrent authority to regulate non-Indian hunting and 
fishing on tribal or Indian lands under 18 u.s.c. § 1165; and (4) 
that the Tribe has can only bar non-Indians from those lands 
described in § 1165. 
~ U.S.C. § 1165 provides: "Whoever, without lawful authority or 
permission, willfully and knowingly goes upon any land that 
belongs to any Indian or Indian tribe ••• and either are held 
by the United States in trust or are subject to a restriction 
against alienation imposed by the United States, or upon any 
lands of the United States that are reserved for Indian use, for 
the purpose of hunting, trapping or fishing thereon, ••• shall 
be [subject to criminal penalties]." 
4. 
The CA9 reversed. Based on its Finch o p inion, th e CA 
held that the United States holds trust title to the bed and banks 
of the Big Horn river to the high-water mark. The CA held that 
Resolution 74-05 was "a valid exercise of tribal power," except 
insofar as it barred non-member residents from hunting and fishing 
on their own lands. The CA also held that Montana has concurrent 
authority to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing within the 
Reservation for proper conservation and management purposes, as 
long as it neither regulates Tribe members' hunting and fishing nor 
impedes proper tribal regulations. 
4. e0NTENTIONS: (A) Montana first assails the CA's 
conclusion that the bed of the Big Horn belongs to the Tribe. This 
is said to violate the Equal Footing Doctrine, under which new 
States receive title to the beds of navigable rivers within their 
territories upon admission to the Union. During the territorial 
phase , the United States holds title in trust for the future State. 
Montana concedes that the United States may grant title away before 
state hood,* but. contends that the treaties with the Crow were not 
"plain" enough, United ·States - v; ·Holt -State - Bank, 270 u.s. 49, 55 
(1926), to show an intention to convey title. Montana 
distinguishes <.:hoctaw · Na
1
tion · v; - 0klahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970), in 
which the Court found a grant. 
Washington and Idaho have filed an amicus brief, r elying 
on ~uyal!up ~ Tribe - v; - Washinqton - Game - D epa rtme nt, 433 U.S. 165 
~H'ont ana quotes from 0re qon - v ·; -eorvalli s· Sand ·· &· Grave l -Co ; , 429 
U.S. 363, 372-374 (1977), in wh1ch the Cou r t used language 
suggesting that the United States could not convey title 
at al l. But Mo n tana does not serio usly challenqe the rule t hat the 
Un ited States may do s o "in case o f so~e international duty or 
publ i c exig e ncy ••• " Shive ly -v; - Bowl by- , 152 u. s . 1, 49-50. 
5. 
(1977), which hel that the Puyallup Tribe lost its right to use 
the Puyallup River fishing grounds for its ''exclusive use" when it 
alienated almost its entire reservation. If all of the riparian 
lands are privately owned, the rule of trust status for the river 
bed creates a "legal Cheshire cat" - although the cat is gone, the 
smile remains. Amici ask why the smile of the Cheshire Cat remains 
hanging over the Big Horn River when it ceases to hang over the 
Puyallup. 
The SG responds that this issue turns on the treaties and 
history of each case. The SG also defends the CA's conclusion that 
a grant was intended. First, the river runs through the center of a 
"permanent" reservation from which all non-members are excluded. 
Second, the 1868 Treaty defined the Reservation as including half 
of the navigable Yellowstone River. Finally, the Crow Reservation 
was carved out of aboriginal Crow land. Thus, the river bed is 
retained by the Crow unless ceded by them. 
(B) Montana next contends that the CA erred in fixing the 
boundary between the river and the riparian lands at the high-water 
mark pursuant to the federal common law rule, ignoring contrary 
Montana law. Montana argues that federal law should borrow the 
state rule in this case under Wilson · v; -0maha -Tribe - of - Indians, 
Nos. 78-160 & 161, June 29, 1979, because a uniform rule is 
unnecessary. The CA9 held that state law would frustrate the 
"federal policy and functions" involved in determining the boundary 
between a river that is held in trust for Indians and riparian 
lands originally allotted solely to individual Indians. The SG 




according to uniform federal standards in order to preserve the 
"equal footing" of the States that own them. 
(C) Montana renews her challenge to the validity of 
Resolution No. 74-05. The CA9 construed the Treaties to grant the 
Tribe a right to control hunting and fishing. This Court has said 
that the Tribe is more than a private owner, possessing "attributes 
of sovereignty over both their members and their territory •••• " 
~ryited - States - v; · Wheeler 435 u.s. 313, 323 (1978). The sovereignty 
does not embrace criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, Olipha~ 
v;-Suqamish - Indian -Tribe, 435 u.s. 191 (1979), but theCA thought 
. -
it sufficient to permit reasonable civil regulation of non-Indians 
on Reservation land. 
Montana argues that Indian sovereignty does not extend to 
lands owned by non-Indians in fee under Oliphant and 18 u.s.c. § 
1165. Congress is said to have enacted§ 1165 in part because 
Indians did not have the protection of any law which gave them 
control over their lands. The SG responds that Oliphant dealt 
solely with criminal cases, and that this Court has upheld the 
right of reservation Indians to engage in civil regulation. See 
Williams · v; - Lee, 358 u.s. 217, 223 (1959). TheCA invalidated the 
Regulation as applied to residents hunting and fishing on their own 
land, and specifically preserved the State's power to regulate non-
Indian hunting and fishing on the reservation. This was a 
reasonable accommodation. 
Montana also contends that the Regulation is so arbitrary 
as to "shock the conscience" and to constitute a taking under the 
Fifth Amendment; and that it deprives non-Indian non-residents of 
~ . 
7. 
equal protection in violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 
u.s.c. § 1302(8}. Resp Crow Tribe answers that people who choose 
to live on a reservation must be prepared to accept a reasonable 
Indian regulation. Moreover, the CA9 · concluded in ·Fisher that the 
Regulation was a reasonable response to serious depletion of fish 
and game. Finally, Montana says that the CA ignored the DC's 
findings of fact in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a}. Montana 
does not, however, identify specifically any such findings. 
5. DISCUSSION: The question of river bed ownership is a 
close call. The difficulty raised by amici Washington and Idaho 
regarding the "Cheshire eat's smile" is particularly puzzling. The 
CA9 appears to have applied the governing law correctly, however, 
and its ruling turns on the construction of particular treaties. 
The questions raised by reservations where the majority of the land 
has lost its trust status and all that remains is the "smile" would 
be better addressed in a case that presents it. 
The other questions appear to have been resolved 
correctly. No,rth -earol ixna -~i ldl i fe ··.Resources - Comm 1 n - v; ·· E.';ts~._erp_ 
B~nd - of - Cherokee, No. 78-1653, which is presently being held for 
No. 78-630, Confederated ·Tribes, raises related issues regarding 
~--------~----
concurrent state and Indian fishing regulations. The CA9 
distinguished the North - Carolina case, however, and no disposition 
of that case seems likely to affect the result in this one. Nor is 
the Court's decision in Confederated -Tribes likely shed any light 
on these issues. It does not seem necessary to hold this case. 
There are two responses. 
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TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Peter Byrne 
DATE: December 2, 1980 
RE: No. 79-1128, Montana v. United States 
Questions Presented 
1) Did the United States by treaty convey to the Crow 
Tribe the bed of a navigable river which runs through the 
reservation established by the treaties? 
2) Does state or federal law determine the riparian 
rights on a navigable river? 
3) May an Indian tribe regulate hunting and fishing 
by non-Indians on fee patented lands held by non-Indians within 
the external borders of the reservation? 
......... . , .. 
I. 
This case arises out of a dispute between the Crow 
Tribe and the state over the extent to which non-Indians may 
hunt and fish within hte external broders of the Crow 
2. 
reservation. The Crows' claim to their reservation dates from 
The First Treaty fo Fort Laramie of 1851, which confirmed to 
them some 38 million acres of land, including the entire 
watershed of the Big Horn River. The growth of settlement in 
the west led to the Second _T~~ty ~ Fo~ Lar~ie e by 
which the Tribe ceded all but 8 million acres, formally set 
apart as their "permanent horne." The Treaty guaranteed the Crow 
the "absolute and undisturbed use and occupation" of the land, 
and the United States promised to permit no persons other than 
government agents or the Tribe's invitees "to pass over, settle 
upon, or res ide in" the reservation. Subsequent legislation 
reduced the size of the reservation to 2.3 million acres. 
Pursuant to two "Allotment Acts", 28% of the land within was .:z¥% 
patented and conveyed to non-Indian indiviuals. ~..Jl.. -1-o 'h.dk-
A large stretch of the Big Horn River, a navigable ~ 
river, flows through the reservation. In the 1950's the United 
States built the Yellowtail Darn on the southerly portion of the 
Big Horn River, condemning reservation lands. This action led 
the creation of thriving trout fishery in the river. This in 
turn led to an influx of fishermen, the great majority of ~ 
non Indian. Concerned , the Tribe passed a resolution 
forbidding non-Indians to hunt or fish on the rese~vation. --This case was initiated by the United States, which LL-~-
~L::f' 
filed an action in the DC seeking a declaratory judgment that  
it h~e ~ the bed and banks of the B~rn River ~ 
within the reservation for the benefit of the Crow, and that ~ 
the Tribe enjoys exclusive authority to regulate hunting and "(~ 
..... -------------------------------
..... ._.~ .... ---.......... _______ ---...... 
3. 
fishing within the reservation. Simultaneously, a criminal 
action under 18 u.s.c. §1165 (trespass on Indian property) was 
filed in the same DC against a fisherman who allegedly had 
tresspassed in the Big Horn, United States v. Finch, 395 
F.Supp. 205 (D.Mont. 1975). The DC dismissed the prosecution 
becaue it ruled that the bed of the Big Horn belonged to the 
state. CA9 reversed, holding that the bed of the Big Horn 
beloned to the u.s. in trust for the Tribe. 548 F.2d 822 
(1976). This Court reversed summarily on double jeopardy 
grounds without reaching the question of who owned the River. 
This present case then proceeded. 
The DC held again that the state owned the riverbed 
and banks. It also held that the State had exclusive 
jurisdiction to regulate hunting and fishing on the non-Indian 
lands within the reservation, that the Crew's exclusive right 
to hunt and fish is confined to Indian lands within the 
reservation, and their right to regulate hunting and fishing on 
the reservation is limted to the right to prohibit non-Indians 
from trespassing on Indian lands. 
The CA reversed in part. It adhered to its earlier C! /} #'f 
ruling that the Crow were the beneficial owners of the 
riverbed. The court held that the Tribe can prohibit all non-
Indian hunting and fishing 
I( • 
on Ind1an lands '\ within the 
----~------'----------------'------------------------------reservation. But the Tribe cannot prohibit non-Indians from 
...,. 
hunting and fishing on their own fee lands within the 
reservation, although they can subject them to reasonable, 
nondiscriminatory conservation measures. Finally, the court 
4. 
held that the state may regulate, concurrently with the Tribe, 
non_Indian hunting and fishing on Indian lands, so long as 
state regulation do not interfere with tribal regulations. The 
CA' s opinion is marked by a pragmatic concern with securing 
appropriate rights and dutioes for all concerned. 
II 
The first issue pres& ed is who owns the benficial c9 #=- / 
inter e ~t in the bed of the Big Horn River. Unless the United 
States conveyed the bed to the Tribe before Montana was 
admitted as a state to the union, the bed passed from the U.S. 
to the state under the Equal Footing doctrine. Congress could 
have ceded the bed of the navigiable river to the Tribe before 
~JtcA the state was admitted. Chocktaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 u.s. 
T~ .. 
620 (1970). Petr's contrary argument has no merit. The question~
is whether Congress intended to convey the riverbed to the~ 
Tribe. Id. at 633. The treaties involved are unclear, they do ~~""'L-' 
not refer the river explicitly except when describing cy ~ 
boundaries. Fathoming the intent behind these treaties involv~~,.~ 
~~~ 
gauging the application of traditional canons of construction _ _.., _ 
G:at.t::~ cr~ 
in this area. ~ 4-¥---<a_:; .. "-
/-..,_~/2 nu.._~ 
On the one hand, "disposals by the Uni teed Stat~ 
~~to during the territorial period are not to be lightly inferred, 
~~? 
and should not be regarded as intended unless the intention was 
definitely declared or otherwise made very plain." United 
States v. Holt State Bank, 270 u.s. 49, 55 (1926). In that 
case, the Court held that the U.S. had not conveyed a navigable 
5. 
lake to a tribe, finding nothing in the relevent treaties 
relating to the lake nor even confirming Indian ownership of 
reservation land. Also significant, perhaps, was the fact that 
at the time of the litigation, the tribe had sold off all the 
land in the vicintiy of the lake, so that it could no longer be 
part of the Indian domain. Cf. Puyallup Tribe v. Wash. Game 
Dep't, 433 U.S. 165, 173-74 (1977) (when reservation diminished 
to 22 acres, none of it riparian, implausible that tribe ever 
had exclusive right to fish in river). In any event, the SG 
presses this latter argument in an attempt to distinguish Holt. 
On the other hand, Choctaw Nation evinces a much more 
sympathetic approach to examining intent to convey riverbeds. 
This attitude sterns from the rules that Indian treaties are to 
interpreted in light of how the Indians would have understood 
its provisions, and that ambiguities are are to be resolved in 
favor of the Indians. Choctaw Nation involved a treaty between 
the U.S. and various tribes, by which the tribes resettled on 
land in Oklahoma in exchanges for quitting their lands farther 
east. The Court held that Congress had conveyed to the tribe 
the bed of the Arkansas River that passed through the 
reservation, notwithstanding the fact that the treaties did not 
mention the river except as regards boundaries. The Court 
thought that when the treaty conveyed land to the tribes, it 
should also be understood to include the beds of rivers 
therein, when 
Moreover, the 
the riverbeds were not expressly 
Court thought that retention of 
excluded. 
the bed 
conflicted with promises in the treaty that the Indians would 
6. 
have "virtually complete sovereignty" over the reservation and, 
that the reservation would never be embraced within a state. 
Finally, description of the boundaries of the reservation spoke 
of drawing the line down the center of the main channel of the 
river, implying that at the boundary the tribes would receive 
half the bed. The dissent in that case adhered to the older 
rule of Holt that since ownership of the beds of naivigable 
rivers is an incident of sovereignty, conveyence should not be 
implied absent stong evidence. 
In applying these principles to this case, CA9 
admitted that the question was close, the facts falling 
somewhere between Holt and Choctaw Nation. u.s. v. Finch, 
supra. The court noted that negotations between the u.s. and 
the Crow were conducted as an affair of state to end 
hostilities~ It recognized that it had been held that the 1951 
Treaty had confirmed the Indians as owners of the reservation 
1 and, based primarily on assurences given to the Crow that the 
terri tory was "your country" and "your land". Crow Tribe v. 
United States, 284 F.2d 361 (Ct.Cl. 1960). The court also 
looked to the solemn assurence given the Tribe in the 1868 
Treaty that unvited outsiders would be excluded and that the 
land was for the "absolute and undisturbed use and ocupation" 
of the Tribe. The court thus concluded that that the Big Horn 
was within the metes and bounds of granted land and went to the 
Tribe with the land. It should be noted that this holding 
follows the Choctaw Nation analysis that if a navigible river 
is within the boundaries of land granted to a tribe in a 
7. 
treaty, then it will be presumed that the riverbed was also 
granted. As mentioned above, the issue presented turns on the 
vitaltiy of this presumption. 
In my view, this analysis is correct. An Indian 
treaty is an undertaking with a political enitity. The rule 
against implying grants of naivigable waterways rests on the 
principle that ownership of such waterways is an attribute of 
sovereignty, and that conveyence of them to private individuals 
is so unsual that a court should not presume that this has 
occurred. However, when the United States provided Indians with 
jurisdictional rights. There seems nothing untoward in 
believing that beneficial ownership of riverbeds is consistent 
with the status of an Indian tribe. Use of the water and its 
other resources could be important for the life of the tribe. 
When thee fact~ are viewed in ligh1-of the rule that treaaeties 
are to be read as the Indians would have understood them, the 
presumption created in Choctaw Nation makes sense. Thus, I ) ?..-t:.~ 
would hold that Crow received beneficial ownership of the bed :;::;:;' 
o f the Big Horn River. ~ 
The strongest argument against this holding is that
the Crow Treaties never promised that the territory given woul·~~ 
never be embraced within a state. This promise implies the 
United States would not give a riverbed away to a future state. 
Here, no similar promise was made. I discount this factor, 
however, because the Choctaw Nation Court made little out of 
8. 
this promise, but concentrated on whether the riverbed was 
contained within the metes and bounds of the granted territory. 
~The question remains whether the Crow still own the 
riverbed. In Puyallup, the Court considered an Indian claim to 
h~ able to fish free of state control in a non-navigable river 
within the reservation, based upon a Treaty clause granting ~ 
them exclusive right to use the reservation. The Court rejecte~? 
the claim in that case because the tribe had alienated all but 
22 acres of its extensive reservation and all its riparian 
land, indicating that the claim to exclusive use of the river 
had no factual basis. 433 u.s. at 174. In a footnote, the Court 
rejected the suggestion that the tribe retained trust ownership 
of the riverbed as unsupported by the record. Id. n.l2. Here, 
although the tribe retains 70% of the reservation, it has 
....... ~-------------------
alienated all but 40 acres of its riparian land. Amicus the 
State of Washington argue on the stregnth of Puyallup that the ~D ~ 
Crow sale of adjacent riparian land extinguished their claim to ~ 
~~ 
the riverbed. Petrs argue that the sales show that the Tribe .' 
never owned the riverbed. The Crow answer that Puyallup 
contains little analysis and that the question of ownership of 
the riverbed in that case was not before the Court. Moreoever, 
in that case there was a question of whether the reservation 
was still in existance, which is emphatically not the case 
here. Finally, the Allotment Act reserves to the Tribe any 
unallotted chiefly water power, a lands valuable for ( 
description obviously encompassing the Big Horn. 
9. 
/~ 
I find this question extremely difficult. Puyallup 
states the problem, but is not helpful in its resolution. It 
seems to have viewed the subsequent sales as negating the idea 
that the tribe ever had the exclusive right it claimed. There 
is no other law cited. The CA did not discuss this issue. 
Tentatively, I would hold that so long as the Tribe's 
reservation retains substantial terri tor ial integrity and afld. 
it still contains some riparian land, then ownership of the 
riverbed is not dissolved. I view ownership of the bed of a 
navigable river as a special category of property tied to the 
tribe's quasi-sovereign status, so that dismemberment of the 
reservation or mass sale of riparian land would dissolve the 
ownersip right. Here, however, the Tribe continues to function --- ' -on the reservation and retains access to the river. 
III 
The parties also argue over whether the riparian 
owners take upland to the highwater or lowwater marks of the :Sk,.ztft.. 
Big Horn. The dispute is over the banks of the river. Petr ~ 
-~ 
argues that the state rule, providing that the lowwater mark Lu::l!::4..,k.,l-
bounds riparian ownership/ should govern under Wilson v. Omaha ~ 
Indian Tribe, 442 u.s. 653 (1979). Wilson held state law of
avulsion and accretion should be borrowed as federal law to 
~4.1-s 
determine riparian boundaries between private land and an 
Indian reservation after the boundry river had changed course. 
The Court held that under United States v. Kimball Foods, Inc., 
440 u.s. 715 (1979), there was no reason not to adopt the state 
10. 
rule as the federal law. The application of this principle to 
navigable waters depends on State Land Board v. Corvallis Land 
& Gravel Co., 440 u.s. 363 (1977), where the Court held that 
the State's ownership of the bed of a navigiable water 
supported thP application of state law to determine the extent 
of riparian holdings. 
The SG argues that neither Wilson nor Corvallis is 
applicable here, where the bed of the navigable river never 
went to the state, and the question is over the initial~ ----------boundary of the riparian land without any movement of the ~ 
river. He argues that federal interst is greater in land and a~ 
river contained wholly within an Indian reservation than it is ~ 
is land bordering a reservation. I find his first argument 
persuasive. The initial grant of the riverbed by the United 
States included the banks. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 
212 (1845). If the state never owned the riverbed, I don't see 
how its law can apply to limit the extent of the Tribe's 
holding of the river. As the Court held below, applying state 
'------------
law would frustrate the interest of the Unitred States in 
granting the riverbed in the first instance. Please note that 
it is decided that the state does own the riverbed, then it is 
plain that state law governs riparian holdings. 
IV 
The final issue is the validity of the tribe's rule 
banning non-memebers from hunting and fishing on the 
reservation. The Tribe and the SG do not now dispute the CA's 
ho~in2_tha_t_t~:~-~=--~~- ------ residents of the V 
r.:_:e~va~~ -~~t~ ~~ty. The dt spute centers j ~ 
on the Tribe's rule that non-Indians cannot hunt or fish on any \ ~ 
part of the reservation not their own. The CA held that the 0 11. ·-~-
------------~ ~-~ 
Tribe and the State have concurrent jurisdiction over non-;v ~ 
member hunting on the reservation; the ,non-memeber must obey 1/Y ~ 
the more restrictive of the two rules. This in effect allows~~ 
.--_~~ q __ /JAJi• 
the Crow to exclude non-memeber hunting and fishing entirely. ~
Withou~t extensively rehearsing the positions of the ~. 
parties, I woul~ agree with theCA that the tribe retains the ~/9.!:,t. 
authority to regulate hunting and fishing by non-memebers. In ~' 
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville, 100 S.Ct. 2069 
(1980), the Court held that the tribe there retained the power 
to tax non-members for transactions occurring on trust lands as 
"a fundamental attribute of sovereignty which the tribes retain 
unless divested of it by fderal law or necessary implication of 
their dependent status." Regulating hunting and fishing are 
even more central to the interests of the tribe than taxing, as 
is indicated by the hunting rights granted them under the 1868 
Treaty. Cf. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 u.s. 191 
(1978) (indian tribes have no criminal jurisdiction over non-
members). The only question that remains is the power of the 
Tribe to regulate non-member hunting and fishing on lands 
within the reservation, but owned by non-memebers. 
Petrs argue that in relinquishing ownership of fee 
land, the Tribe surrendered jurisdiction over activities on 




ground, but Colville is ambiguous on this point. It approves 
taxing transactions that occur on trust lands~ · but also 
approves economic regulation of nonmembers "enetering the 
reservation." Id. at 2081. The SG argues that regulation of 
hunting is not an attibute of land ownership, but one of 
sovereignty. The question is whether the tribe relinquished its 
hunting and fishing rights over the land when it conveyed the 
fee. The Montana Supreme Court has held that Indian tribes 
retain this right over alientated lands within the reservation. 
State v. McClure, 127 Mont. 534, 268 P.2d 629 (1954). The 
Attorney General of the United States has ruled similarly. 23 
Ops. Atty Gen. 214, 217 (1900) ("the legal right to purchase 
land within an Indian reservation gives to the purchaser no 
right of exemption from the laws of such nation"). 
In my view, the Tribe may regulate hunting and 
fishing by non-residents within the 
to who owns the land within the reservation. This seems most 
consistent with the notion of a limited Indian sovereignty and 
allows the Tribe to protect its most precious group asset, its 
~ 
natural resources.! would, however, reserve the question of how 
extensively the Tribe may restrict hunting by resident non-
memebers or their non-commecial invitees. It seems to me that 
such regulation ought not to be so unreasonable that it 
destroys enjoyment of the ownership. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATFll /) ' () 
No. 79- 1128 ~~ 
Petitioners On Writ of Ce .. rtiOrari to the 
v ' United States Court of Appeals 
1-7-fl State of Montana, et al., l . 
U 't d St 't t 1 for the Ninth Circuit. m e a es, e a . s-~ /)ALl./ 
[February - , 1981] A _ ~ ~ ~ t 
JusTICE STEWART delivered the opi11ion of the Court. ~
This case concerns the sources and ~cope of the power of an 
Indian tribe to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians 
on lands within its reservation owned in fee simple by non-
Indians. Relying on its purported ownership of the bed of 
the Big Horn River, on the treaties which created its reserva-
tion. and on its inherent power as a sovereign, the Crow Tribe 
of Montana claims the authority to prohibit all hunting and 
t!r{~tl 
I.e~ 
fishing by non-members of the Tribe on non-Indian property 
within reservation boundaries. We granted certiorari, - Q } 1J 
lT. S. -, to review a decision of the United States Court of / ~ 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that substantially upheld this )?__~~_ A ~~ 
claim. / ~ ....-,....-~ 
][ ~ The Crow Indians originated in Canada, but some three 
centuries ago they migrated to what i~ now southern Mon-
tana. In the 19th century, warfare between the Crows and 
several other tribes led the tribes and the United • tates to 
sign the First Treaty of Fort Laramie of 1851, 11 Stat. 749, 
in which the signatory tribes acknowledged various desig-
nated lands as their respective territories. The treaty iden-
tified approximately 38.5 million acres as Crow territory and, 
in Article 5, specified that, by making the treaty, the tribes 
did not "surrender the privilege of huuting, fishing, or pass-
MONTANA v. UNITED STATES 
ing over" any of the lands in dispute. In 1868, the Second 
Treaty of Fort Laramie established a Crow reservation of 
roughly 8 million acres, including land through which the 
Big Hom River flows. 15 Stat. 649. By Article 2 of the 
treaty, the United States agreed that the res::rvation "shall 
be set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupa-
tion" of the Crow Tribe, and that no non-Indians except 
agents of the Government "shall ever be permitted to pass 
over, settle upon, or reside in" the reservation. 
Several subsequent Acts of Congress reduceu the reserva-
tion to slightly fewer than 2.3 million acres. See 22 Stat. 42 
(18£2); 26 Stat. 1039-40; 33 Stat. 3fi2 (1904); 50 Stat. 884 
(1937). In addition, the General Allotment Act of 1887. ch. 
119, 24 Stat. 388, and the Crow Allotment Act of 19~0, ch. 
224, 41 Stat. 751, authorized the issnance of patents in fee 
to individual Indian allottees within the reservation. Under 
these Acts, an allottee could alienate his land to a non-Indian 
after holdiug it for 25 years. Today, roughly 52 per ~ent of 
the reservation is allotted to members of the Tribe and held 
by the United States in trust for them, 17 percent is held in 
trust for the Tribe itself, and approximatdy 28 percent is 
held in fee by non-Indians. The State of Montana owns in 
fee simple 2 percent of the reservation, the United Stat"s 
lesr. than 1 percent. 
S'nce the 1920's, the State of Montana has storked the 
waters of the reservation with fish. anu the construction of a 
dam by the United States made trout fishing in the Big Horn 
River possible. The reservation also contains game, some of 
it stocked by the State. Since the 1950's, the Crow Tribal 
Council has passed several resolutions respecting hunting and 
fishing on the reservation, incluuing Resolution No. 74- 05. the 
occasio11 for this lawsuit. That resolHtiou prohibits hunting 
and fishing within the reservation by anyone who is not a 
member of the Tribe. The State of Montana, however. has 
continued to assert its authority to regulate hunting and fish-
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On October 9, 1975, proceeding in its own r;ght a11d as 
fiduciary for the Tribe, the United States endeavored to re-
solve the couflict between the Tribe and the State by filing 
the present lawsuit. The plaintiff sought (1) a declaratory 
judgn1ent quieting title to the bed of the Big Horn River in 
the United States as trustee for the Tribe, (2) a declaratory 
judgment establishing that the Tribe and the United States 
have sole authority to regulate hunting and fishing within 
the reservation, and (3) an injunction requ:ring Montana to 
secure the permiEs~on of the Tribe before issuing hunting or 
fishing licenses for use within the reservation. 
The District Court denied the relief sought. United States 
v. Montana, 457 F. Supp. 599. In determining the owner-
ship of the river, the court invoked the presumption that the 
United States does not intend to diveRt itself of its sovereign 
rights in navigable waters and reasoned that here, as in 
United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U. S. 49, the language 
and circumstances of the relevant treaties were insufficieut 
to rebut the presumption. The court thus concluded that 
the bed and banks of the river had remained in the owner-
ship of the United States until they passed to Montana on 
its admission to the Union. As to the dispute over the regu~­
lation of hunting and fishing. the court found that "[i]m-
plicit in the Supreme Court's decision in Oliphant [v. 
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191,] is the recognition 
that Indian tribes do not have the power, nor do they have 
the author<ty , to regulate nou·-Iudians unless so granted by 
an Act of Congress." 457 F. Supp .. at 609. Because no 
treaty or Art of Congress gave the Tribe authority to regulate 
hunting or fishing by non-Indians, the court held that the 
Tribe could not exercise such authority except by granting or 
withholding authority to trespass on tribal or Indian land. 
All other authority to regulate non-Indian hunting and fish-
in~~: resided concurrently in the State of Montana and, under 
18 ·(T. S. C .. § 1165 ( \\ hich mahs it a federal offense to tres ... 
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pass on Indian land to hunt or fish without permission), the 
United States. 
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Dis-
trict Court. 604 F. 2d 1162. Relying on its opinion in 
United States v. Finch, 548 F. 2d 822, vacated on other 
grounds, 433 U. S. 676, the appellatr court held that, pur-
suant to the treaty of 1868, the bed and banks of the river 
were held by the United States in trust for the Tribe. Rely-
ing on the treaties of 1851 and 1868, the court held that the 
Tribe could regulate hunting and fishing within the reserva-
tion by non-members, although the court noted that the 
Tribe could not impose criminal sanctions on those non-
members. The court also held, however, that the two Allot-
ment Acts implicitly deprived the Tribe of the authority to 
prohibit hunting and fishing on fee lands by resident non-
member owners of those lands. Finally, the court held that 
non-members permitted · by the Tribe to hunt or fish within 
the reservation remained subject to Montana's fish and game 
laws. 
II 
The respondents seek to establish a substantial part of their 
claim of power to control hunting and fishing on the reserva-
tion by asking us to recognize their title to the bed of the 
Big Horn River.1 · The question is whether the United States 
1 According to the respondents, ihe Crow Tribe',; interest in restricting 
hunting and fishing on the rese1vation foeu:>e;,. almost entirPly on sports 
fishing and duck hunting In the waters and 011 the surface of the Big Horn 
River. The parties, the bistrirt Cour1, and the Court. of Appeals have all 
assumed that owmrship of the riverbed will largPiy detennine the power 
to control these artivitie . The link betwec•n uwner::;hip of the bed and 
control over fishing finds some implicit :mJlport in early decision:; of this 
Court. E. g., Shively v. BO'wlby, 152 U.S. 1, 17, 49; Mar-t1:n v. Waddell, 
41 U. S. M7, 408-410. Moreovrr, ns a matter of common hlw, casting 
a fibbing line and lure from tl1e riverbank is a tresvass on the riverbed. 
W. Prosser, Handbook of the La.w of Tort~, § 13, at 69. 
Although the complaint in thi~:~ ca~e sought to quiet title only to the bed 
of the Big Horn River, we nole the eoncession uf the United States that 
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~onveyed beneficial ownership of thf' riverbed to the Crow 
Tribe by the Treaties of 1851 or 1868, and therefore con-
tinues to hold the land in trust for the use and benefit of the 
Tribe, or whether the United States retained ownership of 
the riverbed as public land which then passed to the State 
of Montana upon its admission to the Union. Choctaw Na-
t-ion v. Oklahoma, 397 U. S. 620, (:)27-628. 
Though the owners of land rip1u·ian to non-navigable 
streams may own the adjacent riverbed, conveyance by the 
United States of land riparian to a navigable river carries no 
interest in the riverbed. Packer v. Bird, 137 U. S. 661, 672; 
Railroad Co. v. Schurmeir, 7 Wall. 272, 289; 33 U.S. C.§ 10; 
43 U. S. C. § 931. Rather, the ownership of laud under navi-
gable waters is an an incident of sovereignty. Martin v. Wad-
dell, 41 U.S. 367, 409-411. As a general principle, the Federal 
Government holds such lands in trust for future States, to be 
granted to such States when they enter the Union and assume 
sovereignty on an "equal footing" with the established States. 
Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U. S. 212, 222-223, 229. After 
a State enters the Union, title to the land is governed by state 
law. The State's power over the beds of navigable waters 
remains subject to only one limitation: the paramount power 
of the United States to ensure that such waters remain free 
to interstate and foreign commerce. United States v. Ore-
gon, 295 U. S. 1, 14. It is now established, however, that 
Congress may sometimes convey lands below the high water 
mark of a navigable water, 
and so defeat the title of a new State, in order to per-
form international obligations, or to effect an improve-
ment of such lands for the promotion and convenience 
of commerce with foreign nations and among the several 
States, or to carry out other public purposes for which 
the United States hold the Territory. 
if the bed of the 1'iver passed to Montana upon its admission to the Union, 
the State at the same time acquired ownership of the banks of the river 
as well •. 
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Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 48. But because control 
over the property underlying navigable waters is so stro11gly 
identified with the sovereign power of government, United 
States v. Oregon, supra, 295 U. S., at 14, it will not be held 
that the United ·states has conveyed such land "except be-
cause of some special duty or exigency." United States v. 
Holt State Bank, Sltpra, 270 U. S., at 55. See also Shively 
v. Bowlby, supra, 152 U. S., at 48. A court deciding a ques-
tion of title to the bed of a navigable water must, therefore, 
begin with a strong presumption against conveyance by the 
United States, United States v. Oregon, supra, 295 U. S., at 14, 
and must not infer such a conveyance "unless the illteution 
was definitely declared or otherwise made plain," United 
States v. Holt State Bank, supra, 270 U. S., at 55, or was 
rendered "in clear and special words," Martin v. Waddell, 
wpra, 41 U. S., at 411, or "unless the claim confirmed in terms 
embraces the land under the waters of the stream," Packer v. 
Bird, supra, 137 U. S., at 672. 2 
In United States v. Holt State Bank, supra, this Court ap-
plied these principles to reject an Indiau tribe's claim of title 
to the bed of a navigable lake. The lake lay wholly within 
the boundaries of the Red Lake Indian reservation, which 
had been created by treaties entered into before Minnesota 
joined the Union. In these treaties the United States prom-
ised to "set apart and withheld from sale, for the use of" the 
Chippewas, a large tract of land, Treaty of Sept. 30, 1854, 10 
Stat. 1109, and to convey "a sufficient quantity of land for 
the pen'nanent homes" of the Indians. Treaty of Feb. 22, 
1855, 10 Stat. 1165. See Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 
373, 389.3 The Court concluded that there was nothing in 
2 Congress was, of course, aware of this presumption once it was e~;tab­
lishcd by this Court. Ser Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U. S. 584, 
S88. 
3 The Hitchcock decision expressly stated that the Red Lake rr~;erva­
tion was "a reservation within the accepted meanmg of that term.))· 
Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373, 389, 
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the treaties "which even approaches a gTant of rights in lanc.ls 
underlying navigable waters; nor anything evincing a pur-
pose to depart from the established policy * * * of treating 
such lands as held for the benefit of the future StatP." 
United States v. Holt State Bank, supra, 270 U. S., at 58-59. 
Rather, "[t]he effect of what was done was to reserve in a, 
general way for the continued occupation of the Indians what 
remained of their aboriginal territory." I d., at 58. 
The Crow treaties in this case, like the Chippewa treaties 
in Holt State Bank, fail to overcome the estabiished pr•e-
i!Umption that the beds of navigabie waters remain in trust 
for future States and pass to the ne•N States when they as~ 
~;ume sovereignty. The 1851 treaty did not by its terms for-
mally con vcy any land to the 1nui:ms at ail. but instead 
chiefly represented a covenant among several tribes which 
recognized specific boundaries for their respective territories. 
Treaty of Fort Laramie, 1851, 11 Stat. 749, Art. 5. It re-
ferred to hunting and fishing oniy insofar as it said that the 
Crow Indians "do not surrender the priviiege of hunting, 
fishing, or passing over any of the tracts of cou11try hereto-
fore described," a statement that had uo bearing 011 owner-
lihip of the riverbed. By contrast, the 1868 treaty did ex-
pressly convey land to the Cro_'Y 1.~ribe .. Articie 2 of the 
treaty described the reservation land in detail ' and stated 
that such land would be "set apart for the absolute and 
undisturbed use and occupation of the Indians herein 
named .... " Second Treaty of Fort Laramie, May 7, 1968, 
15 Stat. 649, Art. 2. The treaty then stated: 
'"[C]ommrneiug where the 107th degrt•e of lougitut!e west uf Green-
wich crosses the south boundary of Montana Territory; thence north 
along said 107th meridum to the mid-ehamwl of tht- Yellow~tone River; 
t!Jence up said mid-channd of the Yellowstone lo the point where it 
trokses the said southern boLmdary of Monlmw , bt>ing Lht> 45th degree of 
north latitude; aflll lhem~e ea,.;l :~long said par:tllel of latitude to the place 
of beginning .... ;' Srcond TrPaty of Fori Laramie, l\Iay 7, 1868, 15 Sta\. 
849, Nrt. 2. 
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the United States now solemnly agrees that no 
persons, except those herein designated and authorized 
to do so, and except such officers, agents, and employees 
of the Government as may be authorized to enter upon 
Indian reservations in discharge of duties enjoined by 
law, shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, 
or reside in the territory described in this article for the 
use of said Indians .... 
Ibid. Whatever property rights the language of the 1868 
treaty created, however, its language is not strong enough to 
overcome the presumption against the sovereign's conveyance 
of the riverbed. The treaty in no wa:v expreesly referred to 
the riverbed, Packer v. Bird, supra, 137 U. S., at 672. nor was 
an intention to convey the riverbed expressed in "clear and 
special words," Martin v. Waddell, supra, 41 U. S., at 411, 
or "definitely deelared or otherwise made plain," United 
States v. Holt State Bank, supra, 270 U. S., at 55. Rather, 
as in Holt, "the effect of wha.t was done was to reserve in a 
general way for the continued occupation of the Indians what 
remained of their aboriginal territory." Ibid. 
Though Article 2 gave the Crow Indians the sole right to 
use and occupy the reserved land, ancf implicitly, the power 
to exclude others from it, the respondents' reliance on that 
provision simply begs the question of the precise extent of 
the conveyed lands to which this exr.lueivity attaches. The 
mere fact that the bed of a navigable water lies within the 
boundaries described in the treaty dons uot make the riverbed 
part of the conveyed land, especially when there is no ex-
press refere11ce to the riverbed that might overcome the pr:---
sumption against its conveyance. In the Court of Appeals' 
F'inch decision. on which recognition of the Crow Tribe's title 
to the riverbed rested in this case, that court construed the 
language of exclusively in the 1868 treaty as granting to the 
Indians all the lands, includiug the riverbed, within the de-
iCribed boundaries. United States v. Finch , supm, 548 F. 2d, 
·I 
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at 829. Such a construction, however, cannot survive ex-
amination. As the Court of Appeals recognized, ibid., and 
as the rE-spondents concede, the United States retains a navi-
gational easement in the navigable waters lying within the 
described boundaries for the benefit of the public, regardless 
of who owns the riverbed. Therefore, such phrases in the 
1R68 trraty as "absolute and undist1:rbed use and occupa-
tion" and "no persons except those designated herein ... shall 
ever be permitted." whatever they Reem to meau literally, 
do not give the Indians the exclusive right to occupy all the 
territory within the described boundaries. Thus, even 1f ex· 
clusivity were the same as ownership, the treaty language 
establishing this "r:gbt of exclusivity'' could not have the 
meaning that the Court of Appeals ascnbed to it.· 
sIn onE' recE-nt. case, Choctaw Nat£on v. Ol:lahmna. supra, thb Court 
did con~true a reservation grant a~ includirg tlw bed of a navigab'e water, 
and the re!;ponclent:; argue that this ca~l' re::;err.bles Choctaw Nation more 
than it rr::;embles the establi::;hed !me or CGI<!E'S to which Choctaw Nation 
is a singular exception. But. the finding of a conveyance of the riverbed 
in Choctaw Nation was based on very peculiar circum:stanec~ not present 
in this case. 
Tho:se circumstances aro:;e from the umtsual hi~tory of the treaties there 
at issue, a history which fmmed an import:mt basis of the deci:;=on . 
Chocta·w Nation v. Oklahoma, supra. 397 U.S, at 622-628. Immediately 
after the Revolutionary War, the Unit~d States had t>:gned treaties of 
peace a.nd protection with the Cherokee :md Choctaw tribe;;, re;;erving 
them land:; in Georgia and Missi&"llippi. In 3ucceeding years, the United 
State:; bought large areas of land from the lndiam; to make room for 
white :;ettlers who were encroa-ching on tribal lands, but the Government 
signed new treaties guaranteeing that the Indians could live in peace on 
tho:;e lands not ceded. The United State::; ::10011 betrayed that promise . 
It proposed that the tribes be relocated in a newly acquired part of the 
Arkansu:s Territory, but the new territory was ~;oo11 overrun by white set-
tlers, and through tL ~erie::; of new cession agn'ements the Indians were 
forced to relocate farther and farther webt . Ultimately, mo:;t of the 
tribe:;' member:; refused t.o lea,ve their ea~tern land::;, doubting the relia-
bility of the government':; promise;; of the new Wl'<Jtern land, but Georgia 
and Mississip]>i, anxious for the relocation wt>stwurd so they rould a::;:sert 
jurisdie~ion over the Indian !ami~ , p~trportrd to abolish the tribes an4 
'79-112&--0PINION 
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Moreover, even though the establishment of an Indian 
tribe can be an "appropriate public purpose" within the 
meaning of Shively v. Bowlby, supra, 152 U. S., at 48, justi-
fying a congressional conveyance of a riverbed, see, e. g., 
Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U. S., 85, the 
situation of the Crow Indians at the time of the treaties 
presented no "public exigency" which would have required 
Congress to depart from its policy of reserving owenrship of 
beds under navigable waters for the future States. See 
Shively v. Bowlby, supra, 152 U. S., at 48. As the record in 
this case shows. at the time of the treaty the Crows were a 
nomadic tribe dependent chiefly on buffalo, and fishing was 
not important to their diet or way of life. JA 74. Cf., 
Alaska Padfic Fisheries v. United States, supra, at 88: Sko-
komish Indian Tribe v. France, 320 F. 2d 295, 212 (CA9). 
Finally, the United States has been fully able to carry out 
distribute thl:' tribal lands. The Choctawt; and Cherokees finally signed 
new trl:'aties with the United States aimed at rectifying their past sufl.'l:'r-
ing at the haPd:s of the Federal Government and the Stateo;. 
Under the Choctaw treat~· , the United St<tte:s promised to convey new 
lands we:st of the Arkano;as territory in fee simple, and also pledged that 
"no Territory or government shall ever have a right to pas:; law~ for the 
government of tl1e Choctaw Nation ... and that no part of the land 
granted to tlwm ~hall "ver be embraced in any Territory or State." Treaty 
of Dancing Rabbit Creek, Sept. 17, lc30, 7 Stat . 333-334, quoted in 
Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma. supra, 397 U. S., at. 625. In 1835, the 
Cherokees signed a treaty containing ::>imilar provisions granting reserva-
tion landiS in fee ~imple and promi~ing that the tribal lands would not 
become part. of any State or Territory. ld. , af 626. In concludmg that 
the United States had intended to convey the riverbed to the tribe~:> be-
fore the admis:;ion of Oklahoma to the Union, the Choctaw court relied 
on these circumstances surrounding the treatieH and placed ~Special em-
phasis on the government's promise that the resPrved landiS would never 
become part of any State. !d., at 634-635. Neither the special historical 
origino; of tla• Cho<:taw and Cherokee t n'al ie::; nor the crucial provi~ion::; 
granting Indian land;; in fee simple and promi~Sing freedom from ~tate 
jurbdiction in those treaties have any counterpartH in the term~ and cir-· 
cumstanccs of the Crow TrPaties of 1851 and 1868. 
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all its important fiduciary duties tow9rd the Crow Tribe, in-
cluding those related to the river, without asserting a con-
veyance to the Tribe of title to the riverbed.0 
For these reasons, we conclude that title to the bed of the 
Big Hom River pa1"sed to the State of Montana upon 1ts 
admissiou into the Union, and that the Court of Appeals was 
in error in holding otherwise. 
III 
Though the parties in this case have raised broad questions 
about the power of the Tribe to regulate hunting and fishing 
by non-Indians on the reservation, the regulatory issue be-
fore us is a narrow one. The Court of Appeals held that the 
Tribe may prohibit non-members from hunting or fishing on 
land beloDging to the Tribe or held by the United States in 
trust for the Tribe, 604 F. 2d, at 1165-1166, and with this 
holding we can readily agree. We also agree with the Court 
of Appeals that if the Tribe permits non-members to fish 
or huut on such lands, it may condition their entry by charg-
ing a fee or establishing bag and creel limits. Ibid. What 
remains is the question of the povver of the Tribe to regulate 
non-Indian fishing and hunting on reservation land owned in 
fee by non-members of the Tribe. The Court of Appeals 
held that, with respect to fee-patented lands, the Tribe may 
regulate, but may not prohibit, hunting and fishing by non-
member resident owners or by those, such as tenants or em-
ployees, whose occupancy is authorized by the owners. Id., 
at 1169. The court further held that the Tribe may totally 
prohibit hunting and fishing on lands within the reservation 
owned by non-Indians who do not occupy that land. Ibid. 
6 The Crows may navigate the river, Illino·is Y. Ill Cent . R. R . Co., 
146 U. S 387; 33 U. S. C. § 10, fish in it:> waters , Uwted States v. 
Winans. 198 U.S. 371, dock out to navigable water, United States v. Holt 
Stale Bank, supra, 270 U. S., at 59, use water for irrigation, Winters v. 
United States, 207 U S. 564, and own all valunble ;;itPs for power, Crow:· 
Allotment. Act of June 4, HJ20, 41 Stat. 751 , ,[ 10. 
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The Court of Appeals found two sources for this tribal 
regulatory power: the Crow treaties, aaugrnented" by 18 
U. S. C. § 1165, and "inherent" Indian sovereignty. We be-
lieve that neither source supports the court's conclusion. 
A 
The purposes of the 1851 Treaty were to assure safe pas-
sage for settlers across the lands of various Indian tribes; to 
compensate the Tribes for the loss of buffalo, other game 
animals, timber and forage; to delineate tribal boundaries; 
to promote i11ter-tribal peace; and to establish a way of iden-
tifying Indians who committed depredations against non-
Indians. As noted earlier, the Treaty did not even create 
a reservation, although it did designate tribal lands. See 
Crow Tribe v. United States, 284 F. 2d 361, 364, 866, 368 
(Ct. CL). Only Article 5 of that Treaty referred to huuting 
and fishing, and it merely provided that the 8 signatory 
tribes "do not surrender the privilege of hunting, fishing, or 
passing over any of the tracts of country heretofor·e de-
13cribed." 11 Stat. 749. 7 The Treaty nowhere suggested that 
Congress intended to grant authority to the Crow Tribe to 
regulate hunting and fishing by non-members on non-mem-
ber lands. Indeed, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that 
after the Treaty was signed non-Indians, as well as members 
of other Indians tribes, undoubtedly hunted and fished within 
the treaty-designated territory of the Crows. 604 F. 2d, at 
1167. 
The 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty, 15 Stat. 649, reduced the 
size of the Crow territory designated by the 1851 Treaty. 
Article 2 of the Treaty established a reservation for the Crow 
Tribe, and provided that it be 11set apart for the absolute and 
undisturbed use and occupat-ion of the Indians herein named 
and for such other friendly tribes or indivi<.lual Indians as 
from time to time they may be willing, with the couseut of 
the United States, to admit amongst them ... ," (emphasis 
1 The complaint in thi~ case did nol allege that non-Indian hunting and 
fi~hin~ on l'e~ervati.on lullds has impairt:>d lhi::. privilege. 
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added) and that "the United States now solemnly agrees that 
no persons, except those herein designated and authorized so 
to do .• . shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon 
or reside in the territory described in this article for the use 
of said Indians .... " The treaty, therefore, obligated the 
United States to prohibit most non-Indians from residing on 
or passing through reservation lands used and occupied by 
the Tribe, and, thereby, arguably conferred upon the Tribe 
the authority to control fishing and hunting on those lands.s 
But that authority could only extend to "land on which the 
Tribe exercises "absolute and undisturbed use and occupa-
tion." And it is clear that the quantity of such land was 
substantially reduced by the allotment and alienation of 
tribal lands as a result of the passage of the General Allot-
ment Act of 1887, -24 Stat. 388, 25 U. S. C. § 331 el seq., and 
the Crow Allotment Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 751.9 "If the 1868 
Treaty created tribal power to ·restrict or prohibit nou-Indian 
hunting and fishing on the reservation, that power cannot 
apply to lands held in fee by non-Indians.10 
8 Article IV of the Treaty addressed hunting rights specifically. But 
that Article refl:'rred only to "unoccupied lands of the United States," 
viz ., land~ outside the reservation boundaries, and is accordingly not rele-
vant here. 
9 The 1920 Crow Allotment Act. was one of the special allotment acts 
Congress pas~ed from time to time pursuant to t.he policy underlying the 
General Allotment Act. See S. Rep.' No.' 219, '66th Cong., lsi Se~;s., at 5 
(1919). The Senate Committee Report on the Crow Allotment bill~>lHted 
that it "i~; in accordance with the policy to whirh C'ongre~ gave it::; ad-
·hPreiH'e many year:; ago, and which found expre:::.~ion in the [General Al-
lotment Act]." !d., at 5. 
10 The Comt of Appeal~ dil:icussed the effc·ct of the Allotment Acts as 
follows: 
"While neither of the~e Actd, nor any other to whi('h our attention has 
been callecl, rxplicitly quahfie~ the Tril.Je's right::; over hunting und fish-
ing, it defies rea~:>on to suppose that Congre:s~; intended that non-members 
who reside on fee patent lands could hunt and fi::;h thereon only by con-
sent of the Tribe. So f1H a;; the recor1l of this cnse reveals, no efforts to 
exclude completely non-mPmber:> of the Crow Trii.Je from h11nting and 
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In Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Garne Department, 433 
U. S. 165 (Puyallup III), the relevant treaty included lan-
guage virtually identical to that in the 1868 Treaty of Fort 
Laramie. The Puyallup Reservation was to be "set apart, 
~:shing within the reservation were being made by the Crow Tribe at the 
time of enactment of the Allotment Acts." 604 F. 2d, at 1168 (footnote 
omitted). 
But nothing in t.he Allotment Acts supports the view of the Court of 
Appeals that the Tribe could nevertheless bar hunting and fishing by non-
resident fee owners. The policy of the Acl~S was the eventual assimilation 
of the Indian population, Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U. S. 
60, 72, and the "gradual extinction of Indian reservations and Indian 
titles." Draper v. United States, 164 U. S. 241, 246 . Tht> Secretnry of 
the Interior and the Commis::;ioner of Indian Affair;; repeatedly rmpha-
sized that the allotm<:>ni policy wns designed to eventually eliminate tribal 
relat.ions. See, e. g., Report of the Secretary of the Interior (1885), pp. 
25-28; Report. of the Secretary of the Interior (1886), p. 4; Report of 
the Commissioner of Indians Affair::; ( 1887), pp. IV-X; Heport of the 
Secretary of the Interior (1888), pp. XXIX-XXXII; Report of the Com-
missioner of Indian Affairs (1889), pp. 3-4; Report of the Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs (1890), pp. VI, XXXIX; Report of thr Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs (1891), pp. 3-9, 26; RPport of the Commis;;ioner of 
Indian Affairs (1892), p. 5; Report of the Secretary of the Interior 
(1894), p. IV. And throughout. the Congrel:lsional clebatt>s on the subject 
of allotment, it was assumed that the "civilization" of the Indian popu-
lation was to be accomplii:ihed, in part, by the dio;:solution of tribal rela-
tion~. &t>, e. g., XI Cong. Rec. 779 (Srn. Ve::;t), 782 (Sen. Coke), 783-784 
(Sen. Saunders), 85 (Senator::; Morgan ami Hour) , 881 (Sen . Brown), 90() 
(Sen. Butler, 939 (Sen. Teller), 1003 (Sen. Morgnn), 1028 (Sen. Hoar), 
(Sen. Butler), 939 (Sen. Teller), 100:~ (Be11. Morgan), 1028 (Sen. Hoar), 
There is simply no suggestion in tlw legi~Siativp hi:story that Congre:ss 
intended that the non-Indians who would settle upon alienated allotted 
lands would be subject to tribal regulatory authority. lndc<>d, throughout 
the Congrrssional debates, allotment of Indmn land was consistently 
equated with the dis::;olution of tribal affairs and juri:;cliction. S<•c, e. g., 
XI Cong. Rec. 785 (Sen. Morgan), 875 (Sen . Hoar), 876 (Sen. :\Iorgan), 
878 (Senator;; Hoar and Coke), 881 (Sen. Browll), 908 (Sen. Call), 939 
(Sen . Teller), 1028 (Sen. Hoar), 1067 (St>uators Edmuud::; and William~). 
It defies common sense to suppose that Congr~s would iutPnd that non-
Indians vurchasing allotted lands would become subjPct to tribal jurisdic-
tion when an avowed purpose of the allotment policy was the ultimate · 
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and, so far as necessary, surveyed and marked out for their 
exclusive use ... [and no] White man [was to] be permitted 
to reside upon the same without permission of the tribe .... " 
See id., at 174. The Puyallup Tribe argued that those words 
amounted to a grant of authority to fish free of State inter-
ference. But this Court rejected that argument, finding, in 
part, that it "cla.<She [ d] with the subsequent history of the 
reservation ... ," ibid., notably two acts of Congress under 
which the Puyallups alienated, in fee !?imple, the great major-
ity of the lands in the reservation, including all the land 
abutting the Puyallup River. Thus, "[n]either the Tribe 
nor its members continue to hold Puyallup River fishing 
grounds for their 'exclusive' use." Ibid. Puyallup II I indi-
cates, therefore, that treaty rights with respect to reservation 
lands must be read in light of the subsequent alienation of 
those lands. Accordingly, the language of the 1868 Treaty 
provides no support for tribal authority to regulate hunting 
and fishing on land owned by non-Indians. 
The Court of Appeals also held that the federal trespass 
statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1165, somehow "augmented" the Tribe's 
regulatory powers over non-Indian land. 604 F. 2d, at 1167. 
If anything, however, that statute suggests the absence of 
such authority, since Congress deliberately excluded fee-pat-
ented lands from the statute's scope. The statute provides: 
Whoever, without lawful authority or permission, will-
fully and knowingly goes upon any land that belongs 
destruction of tribal government. And it ii:l hardly likely that Congress 
rould have imagined that the purpose of peaceful as::;imilation could be 
advanced if fee-holders could be excluded from fishing or hunting on their 
acquireu property. 
The poliry of allotment and sale of surplu;; reservation land was, of 
com::;e, repudiated in 1934 by the Indian Reorgamzation Act, 48 Stat. 984 
(c·urrenl version at 25 U. S. C. § 461 et seq .) . But what i8 relevant in 
this case is the effect of the land alienation occasioned by that policy on 
Indian treaty rights tied to Indian use and occupation of re;;ervatlo:n 
land. 
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to any Indian or Indian tribe, band, or group and either 
are held by the United States in trust or are subject to 
a restriction against alienation imposed by the United 
States, or upon any lands of the United States that are 
reserved for Indian use, for the purpose of hunting, 
trapping, or fishing thereon, or for the removal of game, 
peltries, or fish therefrom shall be fined .. , 
The statute is thus limited to lands owned by Indians, held 
in trust by the United States for Indians, or reserved for use 
by Indians.11 If Congress had wished to extend tribal juris-
diction to lands owned by non-Indians, it could easily have 
done so by incorporating in § 1165 the definition of "Indian 
tlountry" in 18 U. S. C. § 1151: "all land within the limits 
of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United 
States government notwithstanding the issuance of any pat-
ent, and including rights-of-way running through the reserva-
tion." Indeed, a subcommittee of the House Committee on 
the Judiciary proposed that this be done. But the Depart-
ment of Interior recommended against doing so in a letter 
dated May 23, 1958. The Department pointed out that a 
previous congressional report, H. Rep. No. 2593, 85th Cong., 
2d Sess./2 had made clear that the bill contained no implica-
11 See United States v. Bouchard, 464 F . Supp. 1316, 1336 (WD Wis.); 
United States v. Pollnan, 364 F. Supp. !}95 (Mont.). 
12 House Report 2593 stated that the purpose of tl10 bill that became 
18 U. S. C. § 1165 was to make it unlawful to enter Indian land to hunt, 
trap, or fish without the consent of the individual Indian or tribe: 
"Indian property owners should ha,ve the same protection as other prop-
erty owners, [sic] , for example, a private hunting club may keep non-
members oft' its game lands or it may issue a permit for a fee. One who 
~omes on such lands without permission may be prosecuted under State 
law but a non-Indii:tJ.l trespasser on an Indian reservation enjoys immunity. 
Non-Indians are not subject to the jurisdiction of Indian court~ and can-
aot be tried in Indi11n courts on tre~pMs charges. FurthPr, Uwre are no 
Federal laws which can be invoked against trespa.~,;ers." H. R. 2593, 85tht 
<;on~., 2d Se~s. (emphasis added) . 
,-
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tion that it would apply to land other than that held or con-
trolled by Indians or the United States.18 The Committee 
on the Judicia.ry then adopted the present language, which 
does not reach fee-patented lands within the boundaries of 
an Indian reservation. 
IV 
Beyond relying on the Crow Treaties and 18 U. S. C. § 1165 
as source for the Tribe's power to regulate non-Indian hunt-
ing and fishing on non-Indian lands within the reservation, 
the Court of Appeals aiso identified that power as a•1 incident 
of the inherent sovereignty of the Tribe over the entire Crow 
reservation. United States v. Montana, supra, 604 F. 2d, at 
1170. But ~<inherent sovereignty" is not so broad as to sup-
port the application of Resolution No. 74-05 to non-Indian 
lands. 
This Court most recently reviewed the principies of inher-
ent sovereignty in United States v. Wheeier, 435 U. S. 313. 
18 Subsequent reports in the House and Senate, H. Rep. 625, 86th Cong., 
ht Sess., S. Rep. 1686, 86th Cong., Zd Sess., alw refer to "Indian lands '; 
and "Indian property owners" rather than "Indian country." In Oli-
phant, supra, this Court referred to S. Rep. 1685, w'hic'h stated that "the 
legi~lation [28 U. S. C. § 1155J will give to the Indian tribes and to 
individual Indian owners certain rights that now exist a~ to other~, and 
Alls a gap iu the pre~nt law for the protection of their prope1·ty." 435 
U. S., at 206. (Emphasis added.) 
Before the Court of Appeal~ deci~ion, several other courts interpreted 
§ 1165 to be confined to lands owned by Indians, or held in trust for their 
benefit. State v. Baker, 464 F. Supp. 1377 (WD Wis.); United States v. 
Bouchard, 464 F. Supp. 1316 (WD Wis.); United States v. Pollman, 364 
F. Supp. 995 (Mont.); Donahue v. California Justice Court, 93 Cal. App. 
310. Cf. United Statl's v. Sanford, 547 F. 2d 1085, 1089 (CA9) (holding 
that § 1165 wa~> designed to prevent encroachmPnt::; on Indian lands, re-
jE'cling the argument that § 1165 makes illegal the unauthorized killing 
of wildlife on an Indian reservat.ion, and notin that "thE' applicatwn of 
Montana game law8 to the activitiesr(10n-lndiaus on Indian re<'E'rvHtions 
(!Qes .not interference with trilml ~elf-government on resE'rvation~). 
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In that case, noting that Indian tribes are "unique aggrega~ 
tions possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their 
members and their territory," id., at 323, the Court upheld 
the power of a tribe to punish tribal members who violate 
tribal criminal laws. But the Court was careful to note that, 
through their original incorporation into the United States 
as well as through specific treaties and statutes, the Indian 
tribes have lost many of the attribute~ of sovereignty. !d., 
at 326. The Court distinguished between those inherent 
powers retained by the tribes and those divested: 
The areas in which such implicit divestiture of sover-
eignty has been held to have occurred are those involving 
the relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers 
of the tribe . ... 
These limitations rest on the fact that the dependent 
status of Indian tribes within our territorial jurisdiction 
is necessarily inconsistent with their freedom independ-
ently to determine their external relations. But the 
powers of self-government, including the power to pre-
scribe and enforce internal criminal laws. are of a differ-
ent type. They involve only the relations among mem-
bers of a tribe. Thus, they are not such powers as would 
necessarily be lost by virtue of a tribe's dependent status. 
Ibid. (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, in addition to the power to punish tribal offenders, the 
Indian tribes retain their inherent power to determine tribal 
membership, to regulate domestic relat.ions among members, 
and to prescribe :rules of inheritance for members. I d. , at 
322, n . 18. But exercise of tribal power beyond what is 
nece~ary to protect tribal self-government or to control in-
ternal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of 
the tribes, and so cannot survive without express Congres-
sional delegation. .Mescalero Apache Tribe v. United States, 
411 U. S. 145, 148; Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 219- 220 ; 
Unit ed States v. K ayarna, 118 U. S 375, 381- 382 ; see Me-· 
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Clanahan v. Arizona State Tax Cornrn'n, 411 U. S. 164, 171. 
Since regulation of hunting and fishing by nonmembers of 
a tribe on lands no longer owned by the Tribe bears no clear 
relationship to tribal self-government or internal relations, 14 
the general principles of retained inherent sovereignty did 
not authorize the Crow Tribe to adopt Resolution No. 74-05. 
The Court recently applied these general principles in 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Trt'be, 435 U. S. 191, rejecting 
r. tribal claim of inherent sovereign authority to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Stressing that Indian 
tribes cannot exercise power inconsistent with their dimiu-
ished status as sovereigns, the Court quoted Justice Johnson 's 
words in his concurrence in Fletcher v. Peck, Cranch 87-
the first Indian case to reach this Court-that the Ind1an 
tribes have lost "any right of governing every person within 
their limits except themselves." Id., at 147, Oliphant v. 
Suquamish Indian Tribe, supra, 435 U. S., at 209. 'Though 
Oliphant only determined inherent tribal authority in crim~ 
inal matters/b the principles on which it relied support the 
general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an 
Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers 
14 Any argument that Resolution No. 74-05 i& necessary tD Crow tribal 
self-government is refuted by the findings of the District Court that the 
State of Montana has traditionally exercised "near exclusive'' jurisdiction 
over hunting and fishing on fee lands within the reservation, and that the 
parties to this case had accommodated themselves to the ;,1:ate regulation. 
United States v. Montana, supra, 457 F. Supp., at 610. The Court of 
Appeals left these findings unaltered and indeed implictly reaffirn1f'd them, 
adding that the record reveals no attempts by t.he Tribe at the time of the 
Crow Allotment Act to forbid non-Indian hunting and fishing on reserva-
tion land!:i. United States v. Montana, s·upra, 604 F. 2d 1168 and n. lla. 
15 By dt>nying the Suquamish Tribe criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians, however, the Oliphant ca::;e would seriously restrict the ability of 
a tribe to enforce any purported regulation of non-Indian hunten; and 
fishermen . Moreover, a. tribe would not be able to rely for enforcement 
on the federal criminal trespa::;s statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1165, since that 
l!tatute does not apply to fee patented lancfls See text and note& at 'PP· 
---, 3-upra, 
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of the tribe. 'l'o be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sover-
eign power to exercise some foq'ns of civil jurisdiction over 
non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee 
lands. A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or 
other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter con-
sen.sual relationships with the tribe or its members, through 
commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. 
Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 223; Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 
U. S. 384; Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 2d 947, 950 (CA8); see 
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian 
Reservation, - U. S. -, -. A tribe may also retain in-
herent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of 
non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that 
eonduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political 
integrity or the property or economic security of the tribe. 
See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U. S. 382, 386; Williams v. 
Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220; Montana Catholic Missions v. Mis-
Boula County, 200 U. S. 118, 128-129; Thomas v. Gay, 169 
U. S. 264, 273.16 
No such circumstances, however, are involved in this case. 
N<m-Indian hunters and fishermen on non-Indian fee land 
do not enter any agreements or dealings with the Crow Tribe 
150 as to subject themselves to tribal civil jurisdiction. And 
nothing in this case suggests that such non-Indian hunting 
and fishing so threatens the Tribe's political or economic se-
tlurity as to justify tribal regulation. The complaint in the 
District Court did not allege that non-Indian hunting and 
fishing em fee lands imperils the subsistence or welfare of the 
Tl"ibe.n Furthermore, the District Court made express find-
16 As a corollary, this Court has held that the Indian tribes retain 
rights to river waters necessary to make their reservations economically 
producti\'!e. Winters v. United States, 207 U. S. 564, 576. 
17 Similarly, the com11laint did not allege that the State has abdicated or 
abused its responsibility for protecting and managing wildlife or has es-
tabli:;hed its sPason, bag, or creel limits in such a way as to impair the 
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ings, left unaltered by the Court of Appeals, that the Crow 
Tribe has traditionally accommodated itself to the State's 
"near exclusive" regulation of hunting and fishing on fee 
lands within the reservation, Un:ited States v. Monta;na, 
supra, 457 F. Supp., at 609-610. And the District Court 
found that Montana's statutory and regulatory scheme does 
not prevent the Crow Tribe from limiting or forbidding non-
Indian hunting and fishing on lands still owned by or held in 
trust for the Tribe or its me.mbers. l d., at 609. 
For the reasons stated in this opinion, th$ judgment of the 
Court of Appeals is set aside, and the case is remanded to 
that court fol' further pl'oceedings, 
lt is so ordered, 
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This case concerns the sources and ~cope of the power of an 
Indian tribe to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians 
on lands within its reservation owned in fee simple by non-
J ndians. Relying on its purported ownership of the bed of 
the Big Horn River, on the treaties which created its reserva-
tion. and on its inherent power as a sovereign, the Crow Tribe 
of Montana claims the authority to prohibit all hunting and 
fishing by non-members of the Tribe on non-Indian property 
within reservation boundaries. We granted certiorari, -
U. S. --. to review a decision of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that substantially upheld this 
claim. 
][ 
The Crow Indians originated in Canada, but some three 
centuries ago they migrated to what is now southern Mon-
tana. In the 19th century, warfare between the Crows and 
several other tribes led the tribes and the United States to 
sign the First Treaty of Fort Laramie of 1851, 11 Stat. 749, 
in which the signatory tribes acknowledged various desig-
nated lands as their respective territories. The treaty iden-
tified approximately 38.5 million acres as ·crow territory and, 
in Article 5, specified that, by making the treaty, the tribes 
did not "surrender the privilege of hunting, fishing, or pass-
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ing over" any of the lands in dispute. In 1f68, the Second 
Treaty of Fort Laramie established a Crow reservation of 
roughly 8 million acres, including land through which the 
Big Horu River flows. 15 Stat. 649. By Article 2 of the 
treaty, the United States agreed that the res-::rvation "shall 
be set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupa-
tion" of the Crow Tribe, and that no non-Indians except 
agents of the Government "shall ever be permitted to pass 
over, settle upon, or reside in" the reservation. 
Several subsequent Acts of Congre~s reduced the reserva-
tion to slightly fewer than 2.3 million acres. See 22 Stat. 42 
(18f2); 26 Stat. 1039-40 ; 33 Stat. 352 (1904); 50 Stat. 884 
(1937). In addition, the General Allotment Act of 1887. ch. 
119, 24 Stat. 388, and th0 Crow Allotment Act of 1920. ch. 
224. 41 Stat. 751, authorized the issuance of patents in fee 
to individual Indian allottees within the reservation. Under 
these Acts, an allottee could alienate his land to a non-Indian 
after holding it for 25 years. Today, roughly 52 prrcent of 
the reservation is allotted to members of the Tribe and held 
by the United States in trust for them, 17 percent is held in 
trust for the Tribe itself, and approximately 28 percent is 
held in fee by non-Indians. The State of Montana owns in 
fee simple 2 percent of the reservation. the United States 
less than 1 percent. 
Since the 1920's, the State of Montana has stocked the 
waters of the reservation with fish, and the construction of a. 
dam by the United States made trout fishing in the Big Horn 
River possible. The reservation also contains game, some of 
it stocked by the State. Since the 1950's, the Crow Tribal 
Council has passed several resolutions respecting hunting and 
fishing on the reservation, including Resolution No. 74-05, the 
occasion for this lawsuit. That resolnt:on prohibits hunting 
and fishing within the reservation by anyone who is not a 
member of the Tribe. Tl'.e State of Montana, however, haS' 
continued to assert its authority to regulate hunting and fish-
ing by non-Indi:~m within the reservf!tion . 
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On October 9, 1975, proceeding in its own r:ght and as 
fiduciary for the Tribe, the United States endeavored to re-
solve the conflict between the Tribe and the State by filing 
the present lawsuit. The plaintiff sought (1) a declaratory 
judgment quiet:ng title to the bed of the B:g Horn River in 
the United States as trustee for the Tribe, (2) a declaratory 
judgment establishing that the Tribe and the United States 
have sole authority to regulate hunting and fishing within 
the reservation, and (3) an ilijunction requ:ring Montana to 
secure the permiss:on of the Tribe before issuing hunting or 
fishing licen~es for use within the reservation. 
The n:strict Court denied the relief sought. United States 
v. Montana, 457 F. Supp. 599. In determining the owner-
ship of the river, the court invoked the presumption that the 
United States does not intend to divest itself of its sovereign 
rights in navigable waters and reasoned that here, as · in 
United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U. S. 49, the language 
and circumstances of the relevant treaties were insufficient 
to rebut the presumption. The court thus concluded that 
the bed and banks of the river had remained in the owner-
ship of the United States until they passed to Montana on 
its admission to the Union. As to the dispute over the regu-
lation of hunting and fishing. the court found that "[ijm-
plicit in t]1e SuprPme Court's derision in Oliphant [v. 
Suqua,rn-ish Indian Tnbe, 435 U. S. 191,] is the recognition 
that Indian tribes do not have the power, nor do they have 
the author:ty, to regniate non-Indians unless so granted by 
an Act of Congress." 457 F. Suop.. at 609. Because no 
treaty or Art of Congress gave the Tribe authority to regulate 
hunting or fishing by non-Indians, the court held that the 
Tribe could not exercise such authority except by granting or 
withholding authority to trespass on tribal or Indian land. 
All other authority to regulate non-Indian hunting and fish-
ing resided concurrently in the State of Montana and, under 
18 U, S. C, § 1165 (which makes it a federal offense to tre.s .. 
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pass on Indian land to hunt or fish without permission), the 
United States. 
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Dis-
trict Court. 604 F. 2d 1162. Relying on its opinion in 
United States v. Finch, 548 F. 2d 822, vacated on other 
grounds, 433 U. S. 676, the appellate court held that, pur-
suant to the treaty of 1868. the bed and banks of the river 
were held by the United States in trust for the Tribe. Rely-
ing on the treaties of 1851 and 1868, the court held that the 
Tribe could regulate hunting and fishing within the reserva-
tion by non-members, although the court noted that the 
Tribe could not impose criminal sanctions on those non-
members. The court also held, however, that the two Allot-
ment Acts implicitly deprived the Tribe Of the authority to 
prohibit hunting and fishing on fee lands by resident non-
member owners of those lands. Finally, the court held that 
non-members permitted by the Tribe to hunt or fish within 
the reservation remained subject to Montana's fish and game 
laws. 
II 
The respondents seek to establish a substantial part of their 
claim of power to control hunting and fishing on the reserva-
tion by asking us to recognize their title to the bed of the 
Big Horn River.1 The question is whether the United States 
conveyed beneficial ownership of the riverbed to the Crow 
Tribe by the Treaties of 1851 or 1868, and therefore con-
1 According to the respondents, the Crow Tribe's interest. in restricting 
hunting and fishing on the n~ervation focuses almost entirely on sports 
fi:shing and duck huntiug in the water~ all(l on the surface of the Big Horn 
River. The partiC'S, the Distriel Court, and the Court of Appeals have all 
assumed that ownership of the riverbed will largt>ly dett>rmine the power 
to coutrol the:;c a!'tivitil'~. 7\.Ior<>over, although 1 hr complaint in thi:o; 
ease ,;ought lo quiet. tith• only to tlw lwd of the Big Horn Hiver, we note 
the con<•eo;.~iun of thr Unitc·d ~tate,; ihat if thr bed of tlw riwr pa~ed t<J 
Montana upon it~ admi,;,;iou to the l'nion, thr 8tate aL the i:><lllle lim<! 
acquireJ owner::;hip of the banks of the rivl'r a:- well. 
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tinues to hold the land in trust for the use and benefit of the 
Tribe, or whether the United States retained ownership of 
the riverbed as public land which then passed to the State 
of Montana upon its admission to the Union. Choctaw Na-
tion v. Oklahoma, 397 U. S. 620, 627-628. 
Though the owners of land riparian to non-navigable 
streams may own the adjacent riverbed, conveyance by the 
United States of land riparian to a navigable river carries no 
interest in the riverbed. Packer v. Bird, 137 U. S. 661, 672; 
Railroad Co. v. Schurmeir, 7 Wall. 272, 289; 33 U.S. C.§ 10; 
43 U. S. C. § 931. Rather, the ownership of land under navi-
gable waters is an an incident of sovereignty. Martin v. Wad-
dell, 41 U.S. 367, 409-411. As a general principle, the Federal 
Government holds such lands in trust for future States, to be 
granted to such States when they enter the Union and assume 
sovereignty on an "equal footing" with the established States. 
Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U. S. 212, 222-223, 229. After 
a State enters the Union, title to the land is governed by state 
law. The State's power over the beds of navigable waters 
remains subject to only one limitation: the paramount power 
of the United States to ensure that such waters remain free 
to interstate and foreign commerce. United States v. Ore-
gon, 295 U. S. 1, 14. It is now established, however. that 
Congress may sometimes convey lands below the high water 
mark of a navigable water, 
and so defeat the title of a new State, in order to per-
form international obligations, or to effect a.n improve-
ment of such lands for the promotion and convenience 
of commerce with foreign nations and among the several 
States, or to carry out other public purposes for which 
the United States hold the Territory. 
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 48. But because control 
over the property underlying navigable waters is so strongly 
identified with the sovereign power of government, United 
Sta,tes v. Ore(J.On, supra, 295 U. S., at 14, it will not be held 
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that the United States has conveyed such land "except be-
cause of some special duty or exigency." United States v. 
Holt State Bank, supra, 270 U. S., at 55. See also Shively 
v. Bowlby, supra, 152 U. S., at 48. A court deciding a ques· 
tion of title to the bed of a navigable water must, therefore, 
begin with a strong presumption against conveyance by the 
United Rtates, United States v. Oregon, supra, 295 U.S., at 14, 
and must not infer such a conveyance "unless the intention 
was definitely declared or otherwise made plain," United 
States v. Holt State Bank, supra, 270 U. S., at 55. or was 
rendered "in clear and special words," Martin v. Waddell, 
supra, 41 U. S., at 411, or "unless the claim confirmed in terms 
embraces the land under the waters of the stream," Packer v. 
Bird, supra, 137 U. S., at 672.2 
In United States v. Holt State Bank, supra, this Court ap-
plied these principles to reject an Indian tribe's claim of title 
to the bed of a navigable lake. The lake lay wholly within 
the boundaries of the Red Lake Indian reservation, which 
had been created by treaties entered into before Minnesota 
joined the Union. In these treaties the United States prom-
ised to "set apart and withheld from sale, for the use of" the 
Chippewas. a large tract of land, Treaty of Sept. 30. 1854, 10 
Stat. 1109, and to convey "a sufficient quantity of land for 
the permanent homes" of the Indians, Treaty of Feb. 22, 
1855, 10 Rtat. 1165. See Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 
373, 389.3 The Court concluded that there was nothing in 
the treaties "which even approaches a grant of rights in lands 
underlying navigable waters; nor anything evincing a pur-
pose to depart from the established policy ... of treating 
such lands as held for the benefit of the future State." 
2 Congress was, of coun;e, aware of this presumption once it wa~ eHtab-
lbhed by thi::l Court. Sec Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip , -1:30 U. S. 584, 
588 
3 The Hitchcock clrrision exprrt>fily stutt•cl that the Red Lake re.:;erva-
tion was "a re,;ervation within the accepted meaning of that term." 
Minnesota v. llitchcock, 185 U. S. 373, 389. 
79-11:!8-0PINION 
MONTANA v. UNITED STATES 7 
United States v. Holt State Bank, supra, 270 U. S., at 58-59. 
Rather, " [ fl he effect of what was done was to reserve in a 
general way for the continued occupation of the Indians what 
remained of their aboriginal territory." I d., at 58. 
The Crow treaties in this case, like the Chippewa treaties 
in Holt State Bank, fail to overcome the established pre-
sumption that the beds of navigable waters remain in trust 
for future States and pass to the new States when they as-
sume sovereignty. The 1851 treaty did not by its terms for-
mally convey any land to the Indie.ns at all, but instead 
chiefly represented a covenant among several tribes which 
recognized specific boundaries for their respective territories. 
Treaty of Fort Laramie, 1851, 11 Stat. 749, Art. 5. It re-
ferred to hunting and fishing only insofar as it said that the 
Crow Indiahs "do not surrender the privilege of hunting, 
fishing, or passing over any of the tracts of country hereto-
fore described," a statement that had no bearing on owner-
ship of the riverbed. By contrast, the 1868 treaty did ex-
pressly convey land to the Crow Tribe. Article 2 of the 
treaty described the reservation land in detail 1 and stated 
that such land would be "set apart for the absolute and 
undisturbed use and occupation of the Indians herein 
named .... " Second Treaty of Fort Laramie, May 7, 1968, 
15 Stat. 649, Art. 2. The treaty then stated: 
... the United States now solemnly agrees that no 
persons, except those herein designated and authorized 
to do so, and except such officers, agents, and employees 
4 "[C]omnwucing where the 107th degree of longitude we:;t of Green-
wich crol:lses the south boundary of Montana Territory; thence north 
along :>aid 107th meridian to the mid-channel of the Yellow:;tone River; 
thence up said mid-channrl of the Yellow:stone to the point. where it 
crosses the said ~outhern boundary of 1\lontana, being the 45th degree of 
north latitude ; and thence eai:it along said pamllel of latitude to the plac~r 
of beginning . . .. " Second Treaty of Fort Laramie, May 7, 1868, 15 Stat. 
M9, Art . 2. 
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of the Government as may be authorized to enter upon 
Indian reservations in discharge of duties enjoined by 
law, shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon , 
or reside in the territory described in this article for the 
use of said Indians . .. . 
Ibid. Whatever property rights the language of the 1868 
treaty created, however, its language is not strong enough to 
overcome the presumption against the sovereign's conveyance 
of the riverbed. The treaty in no way expressly referred to 
the riverbed, Packer v. Bird, supra, 137 U. S., at 672, nor was 
an intention to convey the riverbed expressed in "clear and 
special words." Martin v. Waddell, supra, 41 U. S .. at 411, 
or "definitely declared or otherwise made plain," United 
States v. Holt State Bank, supra, 270 U. S., at 55. Rather, 
as in Holt , ' 'the effect of what was done was to reserve in a 
general way for the continued occupation of the Indians what 
remained of their aboriginal territory." Ibid. 
Though Article 2 gave the Crow Indians the sole right to 
use and occupy the reserved land, anrl implicitly. the power 
to exclude others from it, the respondents' reliance on that 
provision simply begs the question of the precise extent of 
the conveyed lands to which this exclusivity attaches. The 
mere fact that the bed of a navigable water lies within the 
boundaries described in the treaty does not make the riverbed 
part of the conveyed land. especialiy when there is no ex-
press reference to the riverbed that might overcome the pr :--
sumption against its conveyance. In the Court of Appeals' 
Finch decision. on which recognition of the Crow Tribe's t:tle 
to the riverbed rested in this case , that court construed the 
language of exclusively in the 1868 treaty as granting to the 
Indians all the lands, including the riverbed, within the de-
scribed boundaries. United States v. Finch, supra, 548 F. 2d, 
at 829. Such a construction, however, cannot survive ex-
amination . As the Court of Appeals recognized, ibid., ancf 
as the respondents concede, the United States retains a navi-
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gational easement in the navigable waters lying within the 
described boundaries for the benefit of the public, regardless 
of who owns the riverbed. Therefore, such phrases in the 
1868 treaty as "absolute and undisttJrbed use and occupa-
tion" and "no persons except those designated herein ... shall 
ever be permitted." whatever they seem to mean literally, 
do not give the Indians the exclusive right to occupy all the 
territory within the described boundaries. Thus, even if ex-
elusivity were the same as ownership, the treaty language 
establishing this "right of exclusivity'' could not have the 
meaning that the Court of Appeals ascribed to it.5 
~ In one recent casf', Choctaw Nation v. 01:/ahoma, supra, this Court 
did eon::;true a reservation grant as including the bed of a navigab1e water, 
and the respondents argue that this case reserr.bles Choctaw Nation more 
than it re;:;rmbles the established line of rases to which Choctaw Nation 
is a singular exception. But the finding of a conveyance of the riverbed 
in Choctaw Nation was based on very peculiar circumstailces not present 
in this case. 
Tho:'ie circumstances aro::;e from the unusual history of the treaties there 
ut i::;i:iue, a history which formed an important basil:! of the decision. 
Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, supra. 397 U. S , at 622-628. Immediately 
aft~r the Revolutionary War, the Uniterl States had signed treaties of 
peace and prott>ction with the Cherokee and Choctaw tribet:~, reserving 
them land::; in Georgia and Mi:ssis~ippi. In succeedi1~g year:s, the United 
States bought largr areas of land from the Indiant:~ to makE' room for 
white ~ett lert:~ who were encroaching on tribal lands, but the Government 
signed new tre<l tiel:! guarantt'eing that the Indians could Jive in peace on 
tho:se lands not ceded. The United States soon betrayed Uutt promise. 
It propo::;ed that the tribes be relocated in a newly acquired pa.rt of the 
Arkansas Territory, but the new territory was soon overrun by white set-
tler:;, und thratigh a :series of new tes:;ion agreements the Indians were 
forced to relocate fartht'r and farther west. Ultimately, mo:st of the 
tribet:~' member~ refused to leave their eastern lands , doubting the relia-
bility of the government's promises of the new western land, but Georgia 
and Mis:sissippi, a11xiout:~ for the reloration westward so they could a~:;sert 
juri::;dirtion over the Indian lands, purportecl to abolish the tribet:~ and 
distribute the tribal lands. The Choctaws and Cherokee:> finally signed 
new treatit's with the United Sta~s aimed at rectifying their past suff~r, 
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Moreover, even though the establishment of an Indian 
tribe can be an ((appropriate public purpose" within the 
meaning of Shively v. Bowlby, supra, 152 U. S., at 48, justi-
fying a congressional conveyance of a riverbed, see, e. g., 
Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 218 U. S., 85, the 
situation of the Crow Indians at the time of the treaties 
presented no "public ex'gency" which would have required 
Congress to depart from its policy of reserving o~ship of 
beds under navigable waters for the future States. See 
Shively v. Bowlby, supra, 152 U. S., at. 48. As the record in 
this case shows. at the time of the treaty the Crows were a 
nomadic tribe dependent chiefly on buffalo, and fishing was 
not important to their diet or way of life. JA 74. Cf., 
Alaska Padfic Fisheries v. United States, supra, at 88; Sko-
lcomish Indian Tribe v. France, 320 F. 2d 295, 212 (CA9). 
For these reasons, we conclude that. title to the bed of the 
Big Horn River pa!"sed to the State of Montana upon its 
admission into the Union. and that the Court of Appeals was 
in error in holding otherwise. 
Under the Choctaw treaty, the United States promised to convey new 
lands west. of the Arkansas territory in fee simple , and also pledged that 
"no Territory or government shall ever have :1 right to pa<-':5 laws for the 
government of the Choctaw Nat ion . . . and that no part of the land 
grantee! to them shall ever be embraced in any Territory or State." Treaty 
of Dancing Rabbit Creek, Sept . 17, 1830, 7 Stat. 333-334, quoted in 
Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, supra, 397 U. S., at 625. In 1835, the 
Cherokres signed a treaty containing ;:;imilar provisions granting reoerva-
tion lands in fee simple and promising that the tribal lands would not 
become part of any State or Territory . Iil. , at 626. In concluding that 
the United States had intended to convey the riverbed to the tribes be-
fore the admission of Oklahoma to the Union, the Choctaw court relied 
on these circumstances surrounding the treaties and placed special em-
phasis on the govemment's promise that the reserved lands would never 
becomP part of any State. !d., at 634-635. Neither the special historical 
origins of the Choctaw and Cherokee treaties nor the crucial provi~ioi1S' 
granting Indian lands in fee simple and promising freedom from state 
jurisdiction in those treaties have any counterparts in the terms and cir-
emnstanccs of the Crow Treaties of 1851 and 1868. 
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III 
Though the parties in this case have raised broad qt!estions 
about the power of the Tr.ibe to regulate hunting and fishing 
by non-Indians on the reservation, the regulatory issue be-
fore us is a narrow one. The Court of Appeals held that the 
Tribe may prohibit non-members from hunting or fishing on 
land belonging to the Tr.ibe or held by the United States in 
trust for the Tribe, 604 F . 2d, at 1165- 1166, and with this 
holding we can readily agree. We also agree with the Court 
of Appeals that if the Tribe permits non-members to fish 
or hunt on such ·lands, it may condition their entry by charg-
ing a fee or establishing bag and creel limits. Ibid. What 
remains is the question of the power of the Tribe to regulate 
non-Indian fishing and hu11ting on reservation land owned in 
fee by non-members of the Tribe. The Court of Appeals 
held that, with respect to fee-patented lands. the Tribe may 
regulate, but may not prohibit, hunting and fishing by non-
member resident owners or by those, such as tenants or em-
ployees, whose occupancy is authorized by the owners. I d., 
at 1169. The court further held that the Tribe may totally 
prohibit hunting and fishing on lands within the reservation 
owned by non-Indians who do not occupy that land. Ibid. 
The Court of Appeals foulld two sources for this tribal 
regulatory power: the Crow treatief>, "augmented" by 18 
U. S. C. § 1165, and "inherent" I1idian· sovereignty. we· be-
lieve that neither source supports the court's conclusion . 
. A 
The purposes of the 1851 Treaty were to assure safe pas-· 
sage for settlers across the lands of various Indian tribes; to 
compensate the · Tribes for the loss of buffalo, other game 
animals, timber and forage ; to delineate tribal boundaries; 
to promote inter-tribal peace ; and to establish a way of iden-
tifying Indians who committed depredations against non-
Indians. As noted earlier, the Treaty did not even create 
79-1128-0PINION 
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a reservation, although it did designate tribal lands. See 
Crow Tribe v. United States, 284 F. 2d 361, 364, 366, 368 
(Ct. Cl.). Only Article 5 of that Treaty referred to hunting 
and fishing, and it merely provided that the 8 signatory 
tribes "do not surrender the privilege of hunting, fishing, or 
passing over any of the tracts of country heretofore de-
Bcribed." 11 Stat. 749.6 The Treaty nowhere suggested that 
Congress intended to grant authority to the Crow Tribe to 
regulate hunting and fishing by non-members on non-mem-
ber lands. Indeed, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that 
after the Treaty was signed non-Indians, as well as members 
of other Indians tribes, undoubtedly hunted and fished within 
the treaty-designated territory of the Crows. 604 F. 2d, at 
1167. 
The 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty, 15 Stat. 649, reduced the 
Bize of the Crow territory designated by the 1851 Treaty. 
Article 2 of the Treaty established a reservation for the Crow 
Tribe, and provided that it be "set apart for the absolute and 
undisturbed use and occupation oi the Indians herein named 
and for such other friendly tribes or individual Indians as 
from time to time they may be willing, with the consent of 
the United States, to admit amongst them ... ," (emphasis 
added) and that "the United States now solemnly agrees that 
no persons, except those herein designated and authorized so· 
to do ... shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon 
or reside in the territory described in this article for the use· 
of said Indians. . . ." The treaty , therefore, obligated the· 
United States to prohibit most non-Indians from residing on 
or passing through reservation lands used and occupied by 
the Tribe, and, thereby, arguably conferred upon the Tribe· 
the authority to control fishing and huuting on those lands.7 
6 The complaint in this case did not allege that non-Indian hunting and 
fishing on reservation lands ha::; impaired this privilege. 
1 Article IV of the Treaty addm.;::;ed hunting right::; specifically. But 
that Atticle referred only to "unoccupied lands of the United Stutes,w 
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But that authority could only extend to land on which the 
Tribe exercises "absolute anti undisturbed use and occupa~ 
tion." And it is clear that the quantity of such land was 
substantially reduced by the allotment and alienation of 
tribal lands as a result of the passage of the General Allot-
ment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388, 25 U. S. C. § 331 et seq., and 
the Crow Allotment Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 751.8 If the 1868 
Treaty created tribal power to restrict or prohibit non-Indian 
hunting and fishing on the reservation, that power cannot 
apply to lands held in fee by non-1ndians.0 
viz., lands outside the reservation boundaries, and is accordingly not rele-
vant here. 
8 The 1920 Crow Allotment Act wa. one of the speeial allotment aetl:i 
Congretil:i passed from time to time pursuant to t-he policy underlying the 
General Allotment Act. See S. Rep. No. '219, "66th Cong., 1st Sess., at 5 
(1919). The Senate Committee "Report ·on the Crow Allotment bill stated 
that it "is in accordance with the policy to which Congress gave its ad-
herence many years a-go, and which found expression in the [General Al. 
lotment. Actj ." fil., at 5. 
9 The Court of Appeals discu:;~:;ed the effect of the Allotment Act~; as 
follows: 
"While neither of t.hese Acts, nor any other to which our attention has 
been called, explicitly qualifie:; the Tribe's rights over hunting and fish. 
ing, it. defies reason to suppose that Congres:; intended that non-members 
who reside on fee patent lands could hunt anrl fish thereon only by con-
sent of the Tribe. ·so far as the record of this case reveals, no efforts to 
exclude completely non-members of the Crow Tribe from hunting and 
fishing within the reservation were being made by the Crow Tribe at the 
time of enactment of the Allotment Acts." 604 F . 2d, at 1168 (footnote 
omitted). 
But nothing in the Allotment Acts supports the view of the Court of 
Appeals that the Tribe could nevertheless bar hunting and fishing by non-
resident fee owners. The policy of the Acts was the eventual assimilation 
of the Indian population, Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U. S. 
60, 72, and the 1'gradual extinction of Indian reservations and Indian 
titles." Draper v. Un·ited States, 164 U. S. 241, 246. The Secretary of 
the Interior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs repeatedly empha-
sized that the allotment policy was designed to eventually eliminate tribal 
reiationfi. See, e. g., Report of the Secretary of the Interior (1885), PP-
i9-112 -OPINION 
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In Puuallup Tn'be v. Washington Garne Department, 433 
U. S. 165 (Puyallup III), the relevant treaty included lan-
guage virtually identical to that in the 1868 Treaty of Fort 
Laramie. The Puyallup Reservation was to be "set apart, 
and, so far as necessary, surveyed and marked out for their 
25-28: Rrport of the Secretary of the Interior ( 1886), p. 4; Report of 
the Commi~~ioner of Indians Affair~ ( 1 87), pp. IV-X; Report of the 
Secretary of the Interior ( 1888), pp. XXIX-XXXII; Report of the Com-
missioner of Indian Affairs (1889), pp. 3-4; Report of the Commi:;sionrr 
of Indian Affairs ( 1890), pp. VI, XXXIX; Report of the Commis::;ioner 
of Indian Affairs (1891), pp. 3-9, 26; Report of the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs (1892), p. 5; Report of thP Secretary of th() Interior 
( 1894), p. IV. An·d throughout the Congressional debates on the subject 
of allotment, it was assumed that the "civilization" of the Indian popu-
1ation was to be accomplished, in part, by the dissolution of tribal rela-
tions. See, e. g., XI Cong. Tit><'. 779 (Sen. Vest), 782 (Sen. Coke), 783-784 
(Sen. Saunders), 85 (Senators Morgan and Hoar), 881 (Sen. Brown), 900 
(Sen. Butler, 939 (Sen. Teller), 1003 (Sen. Morgan), 1028 (Sen. Hoar), 
(Sen. Butler), 939 (Sen. Tellrr), 1003 (:Sen Morgan), 1028 (Sen. Hoar), 
There i:s simply no suggestion in the legislative history that Congress 
intended that the non-Indian:; who would settle upon alienatt>d nllottro 
lands would be subject to tribal regulatory authority. Inde~d, throughout 
the Congressional debates, allotment of Indian land wal:i consistently 
equated with the dis:solution of tribal affairs and juri:sdiction. See, e. g., 
XI Cong. Rec. 785 (Sen. Morgan), 875 (Sen. Hoar), 876 (Sen. Morgan), 
878 (Senators Hoar and Coke), 881 (Sen. Brown), 908 (Sen. Call), 939 
(Sen. Teller), 1028 (Sen. Hoar), 1067 (Senators Edmunds and Williams). 
It defies common sense to suppose that Congress would intend that non-
Indians purchasing allotted lands would become subject to tribal juri::;dic-
tion when an avowPd purpose of the allotment policy was the ultimate 
destruction of tribal government. And it is hilrdly likely that Congress 
could have imagined that the purpose of peaceful a~similation could be 
advanced if feP-holder~ could be excluded from fi~hing or hunting on their 
acquired property. 
The policy of allotment and sale of surplus reservation land was, of 
course, repudiatPd in 19:~4 by thr Indian Reorganization Act, 48 Sta.t. 984 
(current vPrsion at 25 U. S. C. § 4(il et l!eq.). But what is relevant irr 
this rase i~ thr effect of the land aliPnation occasioned by that policy on 
Indian treaty rights tird to Indian use and occupation of reservation 
land. 
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exclusive use ... [and no] White man rwas tol be permitted 
to reside upon the same without permission of the tribe .... " 
See id. , at 174. The Puyallup Tribe argued tha.t those words 
amounted to a grant of authority to fish free of State inter-
ference. But this Court rejected that argument, finding, in 
part, that it "clashe[d] with the subsequent history of the 
reservation ... ," ibid., notably two acts of Congress under 
which the Puyallups alienated, in fee l:limple, the great major-
ity of the lands in the reservation , including all the land 
abutting the Puyallup River. Thus, "[n]either the Tribe 
nor its members continue to hold Puya1lup River fishing 
grounds for their 'exclusive' use." Ibid. Puyallup I I I indi-
cates, therefore, that treaty rights with respect to reservation 
lands must be read in light of the subsequent alienation of 
those lands. Accordingly, the language of the 1868 Treaty 
provides no support for tribal authority to regulate hunting 
and fishing on land owned by non-Indians. 
The Court of Appeals also held that the federal trespass 
statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1165, somehow "augmented" the Tribe's 
regulatory powers over non-Indian land. 604 F. 2d, at 1167. 
If anything, however, that statute suggests the absence of 
such authority, since Congress deliberately excluded fee-pat-
ented lands from the statute's scope. The statute provides: 
Whoever, without lawful authority or permission, will-
fully and knowingly goes upon any land that belongs 
to any Indian or Indian tribe, band, or group and either 
are held by the United States in trust or are subject to 
a restriction against alienation imposed by the United 
States, or upon any lands of the United States that are 
reserved for Indian use, for the purpose of hunting, 
trapping, or fishing thereon, or for the removal of game, 
pe1tries, or fish therefrom shall be fined . .. 
The statute is thus limited to lands owned by Indians, held 
in trust by the United States for Indians, or reserved for use-
T9-1128-0PINIO~ 
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by Inclians.10 If Cgngres had wished to extend tribal juris-: 
~iction to lands owned by non-Indians, it could easily have 
.done so by incorporating in § 1165 the definition of "Indian 
country" in 18 1]. S. C. ·§ 1151{ ·"all land within the limits 
of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United 
States government notwithstanding the issuance of any pat-
ent, and including rights-of-way -running through the reserva-
tion." Indeed, a subcommittee of the House Committee on 
the Judiciary proposed that this be done. But the Depart-
ment of Interior recommended against doing so in a letter 
dated May 23, 1958. The Department pointed out that a 
previous congressional report, H. Rep. No. 2593, 85th Cong., 
2d Sess.,11 had made dear that the bill contained no implica-
tion that it would apply to land other than that held or con-
trolled by Indians or the United States.12 The Committee 
10 Sec United States "· Bouchard, 464 F. Supp. 1316, 1836 (WD Wis.); 
United States v. Pollnan, 364 F . Supp. 995 (Mont.). 
11 Hou:se Hcport 25H:~ stated that the purpose of the bill tha.t became 
18 U. S. C. § 1165 was to make it unlawful to enter Indian land to hunt, 
trap, or fish without the consent of the individual Indian or tribe: 
"Indian property owners should have the same protection as other prop-
erty owners, [sic], for example, a private hunting club may keep non-
members off its game lands or it may issue a permit for a fee . One who 
comes on such lands without permission may be prosecuted under State 
law but a non-Indian trespasser on an Indian reservation enjoys immunity. 
Non-Indians are not subject to the jurisdiction of Indian courts and can-
not be tried in Indian courts on trer:;pai:i:> charges. Further, there are no 
Federal law:s which can be invoked against trcspa!lser:s." H . R. 2593, 85th 
Cong., 2d Sess , (emphasis added) . 
1 ~ Snb::wquent report~ in the Hons<' and S<:>nat!:', H, Hep. 6:Z5, 86th Cong., 
1st Sess., S. Rep . 1686, 86th Cong., 2d Se.ss., also refer to "Indian lands" 
and "Indian property ownens" rather than "Indian country." In Oli-
phant, supra, this Court refenecl to S. Rep . 1686, which stated that "the 
legislation [28 U. S. C. § 1165] will give to the Indian tribes and to 
individual Indian owners certain rights that now exist as to others, and 
fills a. gap in the preseut law for the protectiou of their property." 435 
U. S., at 206. (Emphasis added .) 
Before the Court of Appeals decision , several other courts interpreted 
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on the Judiciary then adopted the present language, which 
does not reach fee-patented lands within the boundaries of 
an Indian reservation. 
IV 
Beyond relying on the Crow Treaties and 18 U.S. C. § 1165 
as source for the Tribe's power to regulate non-Indian hunt~ 
ing and fishing on non-Indian lands within the reservation, 
the Court of Appeals also identified that power as an incident 
of the inherent sovereignty of the Tribe over the entire Crow 
reservation . Un·ited States v. Montana, supra, 604 F. 2d, at 
1170. But "inherent sovereignty" is not so broad as to sup-
port the application of Resolution No. 74-05 to non-Indian 
lands. 
This Court most recently reviewed the principles of inher-
ent sovereignty in United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313. 
In that case, noting that 1ndian tribes are "unique aggrega-
tions possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their 
members and their territory;'' id., at 323, the Court upheld 
the power of a tribe to punish tribal members who violate 
tribal criminal laws. But the Court was careful to note that, 
through their original incorporation into the United States 
as well as through specific treaties and statutes, the Indian 
tribes have lost many of the attributee of sovereignty. !d., 
at 326. The Court distinguished between those inherent 
powers retained by the tribes and those divested: 
The areas in which such implicit divestiture of sover-
§ 1165 to be confined to lands ownt>d by Iudians , or held in trust for their 
benefit. State v. Baker, 464 F . Supp. 1377 (WD Wis .); United States v. 
Bouchard, 464 F. Supp. 1316 (WD Wis.); United States v. Pollman, 364 
F . Supp. 9H5 (Mont .); Donahue v. California Justice Court, 93 Cal. App. 
310. Cf. United States v. Sanford, 547 F . 2d 1085, 1089 (CA9) (holding· 
that § 1165 wa:; designed I o prevPnt encroachmpnt:; on Indian land:;, re-
jPcting the argument that § 1165 makes illegal tlw unauthorized killing 
of wildJifp 011 an Indian reservation, and noting that "thP application of 
1\Iontana gnme law:; to the artivitif's of non-Indian;: on Indian re:;ervation " 
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eignty has been held to have occurred are those involving 
the relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers 
of the tribe . ... 
These limitations rest on the fact that the dependent 
status of Indian tribes within our territorial jurisdiction 
is necessarily inconsistent with their freedom independ-
ently to determine their external relations. But the 
powers of self-government, including the power to pre-
scribe and enforce internal criminal laws, are of a differ-
ent type. They involve O'lily the relations among mem-
bers of a tribe. ·Thus, they are not such powers as would 
necessarily be lost by virtue of a tribe's dependent status. 
Ibid. (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, in addition to the power to punish tribal offenders, the 
Illdian tribes retain their inherent power to determine tribal 
membership, to regulate domestic relat.ions among members, 
and to prescribe rules of inheritance for members. !d., at 
322, n. 18. But exercise of tribal power beyond what is 
nece:ssary to protect tribal self-government or to control in-
ternal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of 
the tribes, and so cannot survive without express Congres-
sional delegation. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. United States, 
411 U.S. 145, 148; Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219-220; 
United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S 375, 381-382; see Mc-
Clanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164, 171. 
Since regulation of hunting and fishing by nonmembers of 
a tribe on lands no longer owned by the -Tribe bears no clear 
relationship to tribal self-government or internal relatiolls/ 3 
13 Any argument that He:;olution No. 74-05 ii:i nece::;:;ary to Crow tribal 
self-government is refuted by the findings of the Di!:ltrict Court that the 
State of Montana has traditionally exercised "near exclusive" jurisdiction 
o,·er hunting and fi:;hing on fee lands within the reservation, and that the 
parties to thi:; case had accommodated themselves to the state regulation. 
United States v. Montana, SUJJ1'a, 457 F. Supp., at 610. The Court of 
Appeals. left these findings unaltered and indeed implictly reaffirmed them, 
adding that the record reveals no attempts by the Tribe at the time of the-
79- 1128-0PINION 
MONTANA v. UNITED STATES 19 
the general principles of retained inherent sovereignty did 
not authorize the Crow Tribe to adopt Resolution No. 74-05. 
The Court recently applied these general principles in 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191, rejecting 
p, tribal claim of inherent sovereign authority to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Stressing that Indian 
tribes cannot exercise power inconsistent with their dimin-
ished status as sovereigns, the Court quoted Justice Johnson's 
words in his concurrence in Fletcher v. Peck, Cranch 87-
tho first Indian case to reach this Court--that the Indian 
tribes have lost "any right of governing every person within 
their limits except themselves." !d., at 147, Oliphant v. 
Suquamish Indian Tribe, supra, 435 U. S., at 209. Though 
Oliphant only determined inherent tribal authority in crim-
inal matters,14 the priuciples 011 which it relied support the 
general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an 
Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmember!! 
of the tribe. To be sure, Indian tribes reta.in inherent sover-
eign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over 
non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee 
lands. A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or 
other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter con-
sensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through 
commercial dealing, contracts, leases. or other arrangements. 
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223; Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 
U. S. 384; Buster Y. Wright, 135 F. 2d 947, 950 (CAS); see 
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian 
Crow Allotment Act to forbid non-Indian hunting and fishing on reserva-
iion lands. United States v. Montana. supra, 604 F. 2d 1168 and n. lla. 
11 By denying the Suquami::;h Tribe criminal jurbdiction over non-
Indians, however, the Oliphant case would seriously restrict the ability of 
a tribe to rnforce any purported regulation of non-Indian hunters and 
fi ::;hrrnwn. 1\!orrover, a tribe would not be able to rely for enforcement, 
on the federal criminal trespass sta.tute, 18 U. S. C. § 1165, since that 
statute does not apply to fee patented lands. See text and notes at PP~ 
---,supra, 
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Reservation,- U.S.-,-. A tribe may also retain in-
herent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of 
non-Indians on fee lands within its reserva.tion when that 
conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the politicay 
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of 
the tribe. See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U. S. 382, 386; 
Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. ·217, 220; Montana Catholic Mis 
sions v. Missou.la ·county, 200 U. S. 118, 128-129; Thomas v. 
Gay, 169 V. S. 264, .273.1[; 
No such circumstances, however, are involved in this case. 
Non-Indian hunters and fishermen on non-Indian fee land 
do not enter any agreements or dealings with the Crow Tribe 
so as to suhject themselves to tribal civil jurisdiction. And 
nothing in this case suggests that such non-Indian hunting 
and fishing so threatens the ·Tribe's political or economic se-
curity as to justify tribal regulation. The complaint in the 
District Court did not a.Ilege that non-Indian hunting and 
fishing on fee lands imperils the subsistence or welfare of the 
Tribe.w Furthermore, the District Court made express fiud-· 
ings, left unaltered by the Court of Appeals, that the Crow 
Tribe has traditionally accommodated itself to the State's 
"near exclusive" regulation of hunting and fishing on fee 
lands within the reservation. United States v. Montana, 
supra, 457 F. Supp., at 609-610. And the District Court 
found that Montana's statutory and regulatory scheme does 
not prevent the Crow Tribe from limiting or forbidding non-
JG As a eorollary, this Court has held that the Indian tribes retain \ 
right,; to ri:er ~at;~;> nece~ry to makr their reHervations livable. Ari-
zona v. Cahjorwa, 81v U. S. 545, 599. 
1 6 Similarly, the complaint did not allege that the State has abdicated or 
abus?d its re~pon~ibJity for protecting and managing wildlife, ha~ es-
tablished its season, bag, or creel limits in such a way as to impair the 
Crow Indians' treaty rightH to fi::;h or hunt, or has impo~ed less stringent 
hunting and Fi;:hing regulation~ within the re~:;ervation than in other parts 
of the Statr. Cf. United State~ v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 410-41I 
fWD Wa:.-;h .) , aff'd, 5:20 F. 2d 576 (CA9) . 
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:Indian hunting a11d fishing on la11ds still ow11ecl by or held in 
trust for the Tribt-) or its members. !d .. at 609. 
For t,hc reasons stated in this opinion , the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals is set aside, and the case is remanded to 
that court for further proeeec!iugs. 
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